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SECURED CREDITOR CERCLA LIABILITY




One of the most perplexing problems facing America in the 1990s is how
to allocate the massive cost of cleaning up the thousands of hazardous waste
sites now littering the country. The Government Accounting Office esti-
mates there are over 425,000 hazardous waste sites in the United States.'
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has surveyed only 20,000.2
The cost of cleaning up these contaminated properties will be substantial.
1. GAO Finds 425,380 Potential Superfund Sites; Florio Hits EPA for Delays in Site As-
sessments, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 2,043 (Jan. 22, 1988). The dramatic increases in
the estimates of the size of the problem during the last few years demonstrate the difficulty in
gauging the scope of the problem. In stark contrast to recent Government Accounting Office
(GAO) estimates, only ten years ago the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated
that there were approximately 30,000 to 50,000 hazardous waste sites nationwide. H.R. REP.
No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120. Con-
gress specifically acknowledged the difficulty of quantifying, if not comprehending, the extent
of the nation's hazardous waste problem when it reauthorized the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1986. The report prepared
in connection with this reauthorization observes that:
Superfund was passed in 1980 to address what many believed was a relatively limited
problem. The EPA was instructed to find 400 hazardous waste sites. Most believed
that cleaning up a site was relatively inexpensive and involved removing containers
or scraping a few inches of soil off the ground .... Today, five years later, our under-
standing of the problem ... is entirely different. The Office of Technology Assess-
ment now estimates there may be as many as 10,000 Superfund sites across the
Nation, or an average of 23 sites per Congressional district. These sites range from
industrial plants to river beds to city dumps where small businesses and households
have disposed of solvents, paints and cleaning fluids. We now understand that a
cleanup frequently goes far beyond simple removal of barrels. It often involves years
of pumping contaminated water from aquifers. The total cost of completing the
Superfund program is estimated to be as much as $100 billion. The total time will be
decades.
H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 54-55 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,
2837.
2. Ann M. Burkhart, Lender/Owners and CERCLA: Title and Liability, 25 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 317, 319 n.4 (1988). The EPA's National Priority List (NPL), a list of sites most in
need of cleanup, now totals over 1,100. EPA Adds 106 Sites to Final NPL, Leaving 20 Sites
Proposedfor List, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 846 (Aug. 31, 1990). The EPA's progress in
cleaning up NPL sites has been disappointing. Less than 4% of all NPL sites have actually
been cleaned up. See Senate Budget Chief Blasts Superfund, Inside EPA's Superfund Rep.,
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The average cleanup cost of a single hazardous waste site is $25.9 million'
and total cleanup costs are projected to be several hundred billion dollars.4
This country produces fifty-seven tons of hazardous waste annually and
improperly disposes ninety percent of it.5 In 1980, after realizing that effec-
tive disposal of "hazardous substances ' was more fiction than reality, Con-
gress acted.7 It responded to the significant environmental and public health
hazards posed by improperly disposed hazardous substances by enacting the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
Sept. 12, 1990, at 3 (reprinting letter from Sen. Sasser to EPA Administrator Reilly (Aug. 3,
1990)).
3. Burkhart, supra note 2, at 318 n.3 (quoting JAMES MOORMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, LAND & NATURAL RESOURCES Div., THE SUPERFUND CONCEPT: REPORT OF THE
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY FOR RELEASES OF HAZ-
ARDOUS SUBSTANCES 5-9 (1979)); see also Patricia L. Quentel, Comment, The Liability of
Financial Institutions for Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REV.
139, 140-41 nn.3-10. Many sites are plagued by environmental damage costing much more
than the national average to clean up. For example, in May 1989, the EPA settled one case
against more than 100 defendants for $66 million. EPA Actions Show Steady Rise Over 1980s;
Superfund, TSCA Actions Decrease in 1989, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1,895-96 (Mar.
23, 1990). Two months later, the EPA settled another case against 59 potential defendants for
$49.2 million. Id.
4. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 278 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2953 (citing an Office of Technology Assessment estimate that cleaning
existing sites could cost $100 billion). Congress now judges the magnitude of the problem to
be substantially more severe. Senator Sasser, Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, ob-
served in a recent letter to EPA Administrator Reilly that the total price tag could be as much
as $500 billion. Senate Budget Chief Blasts Superfund, 4 Inside EPA's Superfund Rep. No. 19,
at 3 (Sept. 12, 1990) (reprinting letter from Sen. Sasser to EPA Administrator Reilly (Aug. 3,
1990)). The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) paints a far grimmer picture and estimates
that environmental cleanup costs at federally-owned facilities alone may cost more than $150
billion. 11 Inside EPA Weekly Rep. No. 22, at 6 (June 1, 1990).
5. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 3 (1980).
6. The term "hazardous substance" is defined in CERCLA by reference to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, the Solid Waste Disposal Act, and the Toxic Substances Control
Act. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). The EPA has published a list of substances which it has
concluded fall within the meaning of the term "hazardous substance." See 40 C.F.R. § 302
(1991). The courts have added their own gloss to the term "hazardous substance" and have
construed it broadly. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 927 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (holding that a "substance is a 'hazardous substance' within the meaning of CERCLA if
it qualifies under any of the several subparagraphs of section 101(14)"); see also Vermont v.
Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 832 (D. Vt. 1988) (holding that substances identified in 40
C.F.R. § 302 are hazardous as a matter of law); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326,
1339-41 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding substances identified at 40 C.F.R. § 302 are hazardous re-
gardless of the concentration or amount discharged).
7. The problems concerning improper disposal of hazardous substances are not confined
to a limited number of businesses, or even industries. In fact, the "EPA has identified more
than 4,000 types of businesses that have contributed waste to now abandoned hazardous waste
sites." Burkhart, supra note 2, at 319 n.4 (quoting 131 CONG. REC. HI 1,080 (daily ed. Dec. 5,
1985) (statement of Rep. Breaux)).
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(CERCLA).8 CERCLA authorizes the EPA to clean up hazardous waste
sites and to recover the costs it incurs, in addition to other specified dam-
ages, from the parties responsible for the contamination. 9 This mandate
may be accomplished in either of two ways. First, the EPA may issue an
order requiring the owner of contaminated property to clean it up, or the
EPA may sue the responsible parties for injunctive relief in a federal court
when there is evidence of imminent and substantial danger to public health,
welfare or the environment. ° Second, the EPA may institute a cleanup
when hazardous waste is released and then sue the responsible parties for
reimbursement of the cleanup costs."
CERCLA broadly defines four classes of persons responsible for cleanup
costs. Persons who own or operate contaminated property, persons who
8. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liabiity Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988 & Supp. 1991)), amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1988)). CERCLA is commonly referred to as "Superfund." Technically, the term
"Superfund" refers to the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund which Congress estab-
lished through CERCLA for the payment of governmental response costs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9631-
9633 (1988); see also Quentel, supra note 3, at 149-50 & n.43 (explaining origin and funding of
the superfund). Congress intended CERCLA to supplement its prior legislation aimed at these
problems. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 2 (1980); see also Susan M.
King, Lenders'Liability for Cleanup Costs, 18 LAND USE & ENVT'L L. 241, 253 n.56 (1988).
The courts have recognized the remedial policy underpinnings of CERCLA and SARA as
well. See, e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (1lth Cir. 1990)
(stating that the "essential policy underlying CERCLA is to place ultimate responsibility for
cleaning up hazardous waste on 'those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of
chemical poison'" (quoting United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100,
1112 (D. Minn. 1982))), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991). There is growing recognition
among corporate polluters that CERCLA will penalize their improper disposal of hazardous
substances, and it is having a positive effect. Companies are managing their wastes far more
carefully than in the past. Justice Department Reviewing Liability Issues; Lender Liability
Cases 'Not Intended,' Reilly Says, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 358 (June 22, 1990).
9. See infra note 50 and accompanying text (describing CERCLA liability scheme).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). See generally United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D.
Pa. 1983). The EPA is responsible for implementing the National Contingency Plan (NCP)
established by CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605. The NCP "provides for the investigation,
evaluation and selection of the appropriate action in response to actual or threatened releases
of harzardous waste." King, supra note 8, at 254. See generally Robert T. Lee, EPA Response
Action: Contracting and Cost Recovery Under CERCLA, 4 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 216
(July 26, 1991) (describing the NCP and its role in cleanup process).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Costs incurred in cleanups are typically referred to as "response
costs." See infra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of liability under CER-
CLA). The EPA is having limited success in bringing cost recovery actions against potentially
responsible persons. Cost Recovery-Inspector General Cites EPA Failure to Recover Cleanup
Costs, 4 Inside EPA's Superfund Rep. No. 21, at 13 (Oct. 10, 1990). The EPA has only recov-
ered $12 million of the $86 million it has spent cleaning up 964 sites with cleanup costs of less
than $200,000. Id.
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owned or operated such property at the time it was contaminated, and per-
sons who generate or transport hazardous substances are strictly liable for
cleanup costs. 12 Thus, one does not have to directly place the hazardous
materials in the ground or on the site to be liable for cleanup costs.'" Re-
cently, secured creditors of the persons in these first two classes (i.e., present
owners or operators and former owners or operators) have been drawn into
the fold of those persons who may be held liable for cleanup costs. 4 Courts
have held, for example, that a creditor may be liable under CERCLA if it
forecloses on contaminated property and becomes the property "owner," or
if it becomes involved in the day-to-day operation of the debtor's business."5
Secured creditors are justifiably concerned about CERCLA liability for
two reasons. First, the average cost of cleaning up contaminated property is
substantial and therefore is likely to exceed the principal balance of the
debt. 16 Consequently, possible environmental liability significantly hampers
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). For a discussion of the scope of liability under CERCLA, see
note 50 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955, 1012 (S.D. Ga.
1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 901 F.2d 1550 (1 1th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752
(1991); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 562 (W.D. Pa. 1989);
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986); see also Risks
to Lenders-EPA Lists Cases Where Lenders Risk Liability, 4 Inside EPA's Superfund Rep. No.
21, at 25-28 (Oct. 10, 1990) (listing response-cost actions involving lender liability that have
settled out of court). The EPA is currently investigating a limited number of other sites for
which lenders may be sued for the cleanup costs. Id. at 28. In fact, the number of sites for
which lenders may be required to help pay for the cleanup has been extremely limited. Lenders
account for 0.2% of all potentially responsible parties identified by the EPA thus far in its
investigation of the approximately 1,200 Superfund sites nationwide. Lender Liability Measure
Still Alive; Garn Says He May Attach It to Other Bill, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1, 173-74
(Oct. 19, 1990). The EPA has apparently received contributions from a total of seven lenders.
Lender Liability-Banks Have No Need of Protection, Group Says, 4 Inside EPA's Superfund
Rep. No. 21, at 12-13 (Oct. 10, 1990) (citing Crying Wolf Lender Liability At Superfund Sites,
Southern Finance Project). According to a recent study of the seven instances in which se-
cured creditors contributed to EPA cleanup costs, all but two involved contributions of less
than $8,100. Id. at 12.
15. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
16. Burkhart, supra note 2, at 324. The costs incurred in the cleanup of a hazardous
waste site can be wide-ranging. See, e.g., United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497,
1503-04 (6th Cir. 1989) (deciding that a liberal interpretation of response costs was appropri-
ate), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1527 (1990); Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem.
Co., 840 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1988) (allowing recovery of site security costs); Brewer v.
Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (allowing recovery of costs of medical
testing and monitoring to assess effect of release on public health and to identify potential
public health problems); Allied Towing Corp. v. Great E. Petroleum Corp., 642 F. Supp. 1339,
1349 (E.D. Va. 1986) (allowing recovery of costs of planning and implementation of a response
action); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 186 (W.D. Mo. 1985)
(describing CERCLA as vesting the government with "broad cost recovery rights"); United
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a secured creditor's ability to gauge the economic risks associated with a
transaction and fairly reflect those risks in the transaction's terms. 7 Second,
environmental liability is not, as a practical matter, an insurable risk.18 In-
surance policies designed to provide coverage against environmental liabili-
ties are prohibitively expensive.' 9
In United States v. Fleet Factors Corp. ,2o the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit became the first federal appellate court to ad-
dress secured creditor liability under CERCLA. Fleet Factors Corporation
(Fleet) loaned Swainsboro Print Works (SPW), a textile manufacturer, oper-
ating capital from 1976 to 1981.2 1 Fleet took a security interest in SPW's
accounts receivable, equipment, fixtures and the land on which SPW's man-
ufacturing facility was located to secure repayment of these loans.2 2 SPW
filed for bankruptcy in August, 1979.23 Fleet continued to finance SPW,
now a "debtor-in-possession," for an additional nine months.24 Fleet re-
fused to continue financing SPW in early 1981,25 and SPW ceased operating
and liquidated its inventory soon thereafter. 26 Later that year, SPW was
adjudged bankrupt and a trustee assumed title and control over SPW's as-
sets.27 Fleet foreclosed on the inventory and equipment in May, 1982.28
States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (allowing recovery of investigation
and monitoring costs).
17. Burkhart, supra note 2, at 323.
18. Id. at 323-24. See generally Yvonne K. Sening, Comment, Insurance Coverage for
Hazardous Waste Cleanup: The Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy Defined, 39
CATH. U. L. REV. 195 (1989). Discussion of the implications of the problems with liability
insurance coverage and an analysis of cases on this subject is beyond the scope of this Note.
19. One insurance company reportedly charges a premium of $20,000 to $25,000 for
$1,000,000 in coverage against liability for cleanup and other response costs. ECS Introduces
Policy to Cover Costs Sustained by Commercial Lenders in Cleanups, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 22, at 689 (Oct. 28, 1988); see also Cleanup Coverage-California Firm Offers First Policy for
Real Estate Transfers, 4 Inside EPA's Superfund Rep. No. 21, at 7 (Oct. 10, 1990).
20. 724 F. Supp. 955, 1012 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 901 F.2d 1550
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991); see also Fleet Factors Complains to Supreme
Court that CERCLA Ruling Disrupts Commercial Lending, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at
1,116-17 (Oct. 5, 1990); Supreme Court Asked to Rule on Lender Liability: Text, 4 Inside
EPA's Superfund Rep. No. 20, at 5-8 (Sept. 26, 1990) (reprinting Fleet's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari) [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari].
21. Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. at 957. The parties structured the loans in the form of a
"factoring agreement," an agreement in which funds are advanced primarily against assign-
ments of the debtor's interest in its accounts receivable. Id. at 957.
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Fleet then hired a contractor to auction the foreclosed collateral and the
majority was sold "as is" and "in place" a month later.29 A third party, also
hired by Fleet, removed the remainder of SPW's equipment in August.30
Fleet, however, never foreclosed on SPW's plant.3 Nearly two years later,
the EPA discovered approximately 700 drums of chemicals on the property
and substantial amounts of asbestos in some of the plant buildings.32 The
EPA disposed of the chemicals and asbestos at a cost of $400,000.33
The EPA sued Fleet under CERCLA for the cost of its cleanup. It as-
serted two alternative theories for Fleet's liability under CERCLA for these
costs. The EPA argued that Fleet was liable as both the current "owner and
operator" of the SPW plant under CERCLA § 9607(a)(1) and as the "owner
and operator" at the time of the illegal disposal of the hazardous substances
under CERCLA § 9607(a)(2).34 The district court held that Fleet was not
the current owner and operator of the plant.3 5 The court, however, denied
Fleet's motion to dismiss the action on the second asserted basis of Fleet's
liability as the "owner and operator" at the time the hazardous substances
were illegally disposed.3 6 Both Fleet and the EPA appealed.3 7
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Fleet Factors stunned the financial com-
munity.38 The decision was viewed as significantly expanding the bases
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1553. The record does not explain Fleet's failure to foreclose on the realty.
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that Fleet, because of the decision in United States v.
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986), was concerned with owner
liability under CERCLA and concluded that the value of the collateral did not justify risking
exposure for cleanup costs.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1554.
35. Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. at 960. Cross motions for summary judgment made this
question moot. Id.
36. Id. at 961-62.
37. This was the first appellate court decision testing liability of secured creditors under
CERCLA. The Ninth Circuit decided a case within a month of Fleet Factors that discussed
some of the issues addressed by the Eleventh Circuit in Fleet Factors and generally endorsed
the Eleventh Circuit's decision. See In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
38. See, e.g., Patrick A. Parenteau & Craig N. Johnston, The Big Chill. The Impact of
Fleet Factors on Lenders, 20 Chem. Waste Litig. Rep. (CLRI) No. 3, at 380 (Aug. 1990)
(describing decision as "rock[ing] the financial world"). In fact, some attorneys are advising
clients to simply ignore the opinion because "it is too extreme to be taken seriously by other
courts." In Issue of First Federal Appellate Impression, Eleventh Circuit Rules that CERCLA
Liability Includes Secured Creditors Whose Involvement in Management is Sufficiently Broad to
be Able to Affect Hazardous Waste Disposal Decisions, 20 Chem. Waste Litig. Rep. (CLRI) No.
2, at 220 (July 1990).
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upon which a secured creditor may be held liable under CERCLA.3 9 It
suggests that creditors will subject themselves to CERCLA liability when
they participate in the management of a debtor to a degree indicating a "ca-
pacity to influence" the debtor's hazardous waste disposal decisions.' ° This
view of creditor conduct triggering liability is significantly more expansive
than that imposed by the other courts that have examined this issue.4 1
The courts, Congress and the EPA have simultaneously confronted the
principal issue in Fleet Factors. Each is attempting to determine the circum-
stances under which a secured creditor is liable for environmental contami-
nation caused by a debtor consistent with CERCLA. This Note begins by
briefly reviewing CERCLA's statutory framework. It then considers the
conflicting body of law that evolved prior to Fleet Factors. The Note next
analyzes Fleet Factors and evaluates criticism of the decision by members of
the financial and legal communities.4 2 This Note then critiques Fleet Fac-
tors' analysis of the "secured creditor exemption" and probes the function of
secured creditor liability under CERCLA: Congress's intent to create a pri-
vate enforcement mechanism to aid in the accomplishment of CERCLA's
broad remedial goals. This Note argues that secured creditors play the inte-
gral role in this enforcement mechanism and indeed must do so if it is to
function efficiently. Finally, this Note discusses the efforts of Congress and
the EPA to play a greater role in determining when secured creditors should
be liable for environmental damage caused by their debtors. This Note con-
cludes that Fleet Factors, which holds that secured creditors who engage in
more than discrete participation in their debtors' financial management are
liable under CERCLA, is consistent with CERCLA's broad remedial man-
date and is essential to its success. Imposing liability on secured creditors
creates a private enforcement mechanism that leads to the identification of
contaminated property. It also creates strong economic incentives for prop-
39. Counsel for Fleet argued that the panel's decision creates a new class of liable persons
in "failing to give any significant effect to the secured creditor exemption." Petition for Certio-
rari, supra note 20, at 7-10.
40. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
41. Earlier courts held that a secured creditor must become involved in day-to-day opera-
tional affairs before incurring liability. See Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. at 960; Guidice v. BFG
Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 562-63 (W.D. Pa. 1989); United States v.
Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,995 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
42. See, e.g., Parenteau, supra note 38, at 380; Douglas A. Cohen & Stephen W. Aronson,
Taking Possession of Personal Property: U.S. v. Fleet Factors, What's Next for Secured Lenders
Under CERCLA, 17 Chem. Waste Litig. Rep. (CLRI) at 940, 942 (Apr. 1990); Fleet Factors
Creates Dilemma for Lenders, ABA Conferees Told, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 113
(June 20, 1990) (quoting an attorney who termed the opinion "useless" in aiding secured credi-
tors' understanding of what conduct will subject them to CERCLA liability).
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erty owners to voluntarily clean up contaminated property and avoid future
contamination.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE SECURED CREDITOR EXEMPTION
A. CERCLA's Statutory Mandate: "The Polluter Must Pay"
In enacting CERCLA, Congress determined that existing hazardous
waste sites must be cleaned up and those who created or contributed to the
hazardous waste problem must participate in this effort.4 3 CERCLA was
the second step in Congress's attempt to change the way companies evaluate
the cost of pollution in their business endeavors." CERCLA's predecessor,
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),45 was the first step.
RCRA, enacted in 1976, was designed to control the handling of hazardous
wastes from creation through disposal.46 CERCLA, enacted four years
later, was designed to supplement RCRA by providing the EPA with the
enforcement authority to locate and clean up existing hazardous waste
sites.47 It targets four classes of "persons ' 4 8 who, regardless of fault, 49 are
43. See, e.g., Burkhart, supra note 2, at 325-26 nn.18-21; United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 849 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
44. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125 (stating "this legislation [is intended] to initiate and establish a com-
prehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associ-
ated with abandoned and inactive waste disposal sites"); Burkhart, supra note 2, at 326 nn.20-
21.
45. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795
(1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988)).
46. See King, supra note 8, at 245-52 (discussing general background and operation of
RCRA).
47. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125.
48. The term "person" is defined as an "individual, firm, corporation, association, part-
nership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, mu-
nicipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(21) (1988).
49. The legislative history to one of the bills incorporated into CERCLA explains that the
imposition of strict liability was designed to assure "that those who benefit financially from a
commercial activity internalize the health and environmental costs of that activity into their
cost of doing business." S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 13 (1980), quoted in
United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 858 (D. Del. 1989). CERCLA defines
"liability" as interpreted under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988). 42
U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1988). The Clean Water Act has been construed to impose strict liability
on responsible parties. See, e.g., Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609,
613 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir. 1978).
Courts have therefore interpreted CERCLA as imposing strict liability. See, e.g., New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Northeastern Phar-
maceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in
[Vol. 41:211
Secured Creditor CERCLA Liability
liable for contamination damage and cleanup costs:5  (1) the current owners
part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v. Chem-
Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544
F. Supp. 1135, 1140 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1982). This result was ratified by Congress in 1986 when it
enacted SARA. See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 278 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835. CERCLA, in fact, does not impose strict liability. The statute pro-
vides for three affirmative defenses to the imposition of liability. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)
(1988). There is also a defense contained in the definitional section of the statute that is com-
monly referred to as "the innocent landowner defense." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988). Discus-
sion of the affirmative defenses to CERCLA liability and the innocent landowner defense is
beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Elizabeth A. Glass, Note, Superfund and SARA:
Are There Any Defenses Left?, 12 HARV. ENV. L. REV. 385 (1988); James M. Strock, The
Genesis of the 'Innocent Landowner' Defense, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 592 (Oct. 5,
1988); James E. McNerney et al., Tilting at Windmills: Trying to be an Innocent Purchaser, 4
Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 135 (July 5, 1989); James C. Mauch, A Proposed Solution to
the Uncertainty Surrounding the Innocent Landowner Defense, 4 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No.
25, at 744 (Nov. 22, 1989); James P. O'Brien, EPA's Landowner Liability Guidance, 4 Toxics
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 184 (July 19, 1989); Daniel M. Steinway, The Innocent Landowner
Defense: An Emerging Doctrine, 4 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 486 (Sept. 27, 1989).
50. CERCLA liability is divided into four categories: cleanup costs (including enforce-
ment costs), natural resource damages, civil penalties, and criminal penalties. Cleanup costs
are divided into two categories: "removal" costs and "remedial action" costs. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601(23)-(24), 9607(a) (1988). "Removal" is defined as the cleanup or removal of released
hazardous substances. Id. § 9601(23). Removal costs can include costs incurred in whatever
emergency action the EPA deems necessary, such as erecting a security fence around the con-
taminated property, providing alternative water supplies, or even temporary relocation of local
residents who may be affected by the release of the hazardous substance. Id. "Remedial ac-
tion" refers to returning the affected land, or other contaminated property, to its pre-release
condition. Id. § 9601(24). Remedial action could, therefore, include any or all of the follow-
ing: storage, confinement, dredging, excavation and destruction of contaminated property or
soil. Liability for damage to "natural resources" includes liability for damages beyond the
remediation of the ground and water at a contaminated property. See, e.g., Idaho v. Bunker
Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 673-75 (D. Idaho 1986); see also Resource Damages-Long Awaited
Rules Could be Superseded by Congress, 4 Inside EPA's Superfund Rep. No. 21, at 21 (Oct. 10,
1990). The term "natural resources" includes: "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground
water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in
trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States... any state or local
government, [or] any foreign government." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16). Maximum liability for
damage to natural resources is $50 million. Id. Punitive damages may be also be imposed
under CERCLA. Punitive damages are triggered where a responsible party willfully refuses to
comply with EPA cleanup orders issued under the Act. Id. § 9607(c)(3). Punitive damages
may treble the amount actually incurred by EPA in conducting the cleanup efforts. Civil and
criminal penalties under CERCLA are equally severe. CERCLA provides for the imposition
of both civil and criminal penalties for persons who fail to comply with EPA orders or regula-
tions. Id. §§ 9603(b), 9609. The amount of civil penalties on the length of time it takes to
correct the violation and the nature of the violation itself. Id. § 9609. The maximum criminal
penalty under CERCLA is imprisonment for five years. Id. § 9603(b). This penalty may be
imposed for violation of the CERCLA notice requirements, destruction of records and the
filing of false information. Id. § 9603(b)(3). Imposing criminal penalties is becoming more
common. For example, on March 14, 1990, a man was sentenced to 41 months in prison,
without eligibility for parole, for conduct relating to illegally dumping 16 55-gallon drums of
toxic chemicals into a small tributary in rural Mississippi. Mississippi Man Sentenced to Prison
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and operators;"' (2) the owners or operators of the property at the time a
hazardous substance was improperly disposed of;52 (3) the persons who ar-
ranged for the transportation, disposal, or treatment of the hazardous sub-
stances;" a and (4) the persons who transported hazardous substances to the
property.54
The case law involving actions against secured creditors have premised
CERCLA liability on conduct by the creditor falling within the first two
classes. The linchpin term employed in these first two classes of liable per-
sons is "owner and operator." CERCLA defines an "owner or operator" as
a person who "own[s] or operate[s]" contaminated property.55 The defini-
tion concludes with the following critical caveat: "such term does not in-
clude a person who, without participating in the management of a... facility,
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the...
facility."' s6 This part of the definition is commonly referred to as the "se-
cured creditor exemption."
5 7
for Dumping Hazardous Waste, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 1918 (Mar. 30, 1990). SARA
amended CERCLA by establishing that all cleanup costs incurred by the EPA and damages
awarded by a court constitute a lien in favor of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 9607. The lien
attaches to all real property subject to, or affected by, a cleanup action. The lien does not have
priority over claims of a subsequent purchaser, a holder of a perfected security interest, or a
judgment creditor unless the government can show that such parties had actual or constructive
notice of the costs incurred by the government in connection with the affected property. Id.
§ 9607(l)(3). After the government lien is perfected, it will have priority over subsequent
claims against the property filed by other creditors. Id,
51. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988); see, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d
1032, 1042-44 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding current owner of property liable for cleanup costs even
though the party had not owned or operated the site at the time of the illegal disposal).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
53. Id. § 9607(a)(3). Discussion of this class of responsible persons is beyond the scope of
this Note.
54. Id. § 9607(a)(4). Discussion of this class of responsible persons is beyond the scope of
this Note.
55. Id. § 9601(20)(A). The term for most types of contaminated property used in CER-
CLA is "facility." A "facility" is
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline .... well, pit,
pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling
stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been de-
posited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not
include any consumer product in consumer use.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
56. Id. § 9601(20)(A) (emphasis added).
57. See, e.g., Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 562 (W.D. Pa.
1989). The district court judge that decided Fleet Factors was himself sufficiently unsure of his
construction of the term "owner or operator" that he, sua sponte, certified it to the Eleventh
Circuit. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 n.2 (l1th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 1 I1 S. Ct. 752 (1991). Numerous legal scholars have entered the fray offering
interpretations of the exemption. See, e.g., Roslyn Tom, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender
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B. Interpretations of the Secured Creditor Exemption Before Fleet
Factors--Mixed Results on the Appropriate Threshold for
Secured Creditor Liability
Early decisions defining the scope of the secured creditor exemption have
been inconsistent.5 8 Courts have agreed that creditors clearly may act in
ways that qualify them as an "owner or operator" for the purpose of CER-
CLA cleanup liability.59 However, the courts have not yet developed a
principled means of determining when a creditor becomes an "owner or op-
erator" rather than a third-party financier.' The early decisions focused on
two questions central to unraveling the meaning of the secured creditor ex-
emption. First, the courts addressed the meaning of the phrase "primarily to
protect a security interest."61 These courts examined whether the secured
creditor exemption protects all conduct taken "primarily to protect a secur-
ity interest" from liability.62 Some courts concluded that any conduct rea-
sonably designed to "protect the security interest," including foreclosure,
was encompassed within the exemption and therefore would not subject the
creditor to liability.63 Other courts disagreed and held that some actions,
such as foreclosure, are not protected regardless of the creditor's motive.
For example, in United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.,64 the court
concluded that the exemption does not protect creditors who foreclose. The
exemption, by its own terms, only protects a creditor who "hold [s] indicia of
Management Participation Under Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J. 925, 928-29
(1989); Joel R. Burcat, Environmental Liability of Creditors: Open Season on Banks, Creditors
& Other Deep Pockets, 103 BANKING L.J. 509, 513-14 (1986).
58. Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 556; United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955
(S.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 901 F.2d 1550 (1 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 752 (1991); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986);
United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
Other courts have addressed this question but have focused on other related issues. See In re
T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); Tanglewood E. Homeowners v.
Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988).
59. See, e.g., Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 577; Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 563.
60. Compare Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 577 with Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
61. See, e.g., Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 578-79; Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996. The same sentence of the secured creditor exemption contains these
two phrases. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988) (stating that "the term ['owner or operator']
does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of the facility, holds
indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the ... facility") (emphasis
added).
62. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579-80; Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) at 20,996; Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 561-63.
63. See, e.g., Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996; In re T.P. Long
Chem. Inc., 45 B.R. 278, 288-89 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
64. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579-80.
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ownership." 65 Foreclosure extinguishes the security interest and, therefore,
renders the exemption inapplicable. 66 The court concluded that this inter-
pretation of the exemption made sense because the exemption was intended
to ensure that mortgagees would not be treated differently under CERCLA
merely by virtue of different treatment of mortgages under state law.6 7
Second, courts, recognizing that a creditor "participating in the manage-
ment of the facility" is by definition acting outside of the exemption's protec-
tion, have attempted to distinguish permissible and impermissible
participation in management. 68 The courts have adopted two alternate ap-
proaches in distinguishing between such forms of creditor participation in
management. 69 The first approach, a "high-level participatory" approach,
holds that secured creditors must be allowed maximum flexibility when deal-
ing with debtors. Under this approach, a secured creditor will only be liable
for cleanup costs if it becomes involved in the "day-to-day operational af-
fairs" of the debtor.7" Courts adopting this approach reason that liberal im-
position of liability on secured creditors could adversely affect a creditor's
investment and the accomplishment of CERCLA's goals.7 ' The second ap-
proach, a "low-level participatory" approach, applies a more literal reading
65. Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 579-80. A majority of states treat mortgages as conveying no title to the encum-
bered property. Id. Thus, a mortgage in these states only creates a right to force a sale of the
mortgaged property in the event the mortgagor defaults under the terms of the mortgage. Id.
In these states, called "lien- theory states," a mortgagee would not be an "owner" under CER-
CLA because the mortgage only conveys equitable title to the property. Id. However, in the
minority of states in which mortgages are considered to convey title to property to the mortga-
gee for the term of the mortgage, so-called "title-theory states," a mortgagee would be liable
under CERCLA as the "owner" of the property. Id. Thus, the Maryland Bank & Trust court
concluded that the secured creditor exemption was designed to eliminate any discrepancy in
treatment of creditors under CERCLA simply based on the difference in the treatment of
mortgages in lien-theory states and in mortgage-theory states. Id.; see also infra notes 110-11.
68. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,996 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 4, 1985); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 562 (W.D.
Pa. 1989); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955, 960 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I I l S. Ct. 752 (1991); United
States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (construing the holding in
Mirabile and Fleet Factors as "suggest[ing] that a mortgagee can be held under CERCLA only
if the mortgagee participated in the managerial and operational aspects of the facility in ques-
tion"). The statute does not provide any direct guidance in distinguishing between permissible
and impermissible participation in management. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (1988) (providing
that "owner or operator" does not include a person who "without participating in the manage-
ment of the. . . facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in
the ... facility") (emphasis added).
69. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
70. Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. at 960; Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 562.
71. See Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 562.
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of the phrase "participate[d] in the management of the facility." These
courts hold that a creditor is not protected by the secured creditor exemp-
tion if it has provided more than "financial advice" or "isolated instances of
specific management advice" to a debtor.7 2
1. United States v. Mirabile" Creditors Are Exempt From Liability If
They Are "Protecting" Their Security Interest
Two courts have advocated a high-level participatory construction of the
secured creditor exemption.7" In the first case, United States v. Mirabile,74
American Bank & Trust Co. foreclosed on a paint factory owned and oper-
ated by its debtor, Turco, Inc. American Bank assigned its winning bid at
foreclosure to the Mirabiles four months after the foreclosure sale.75 The
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources contacted the
Mirabiles shortly after they acquired the property76 and ordered removal of
several hundred drums containing hazardous substances from the prop-
erty.77 The Mirabiles moved the drums to a warehouse on the property.78
The EPA, however, concluded that the Mirabiles' efforts were inadequate,
cleaned up the property itself, and sued the Mirabiles for the $250,000 it
incurred in the cleanup. 79 The Mirabiles, in turn, sued the banks, including
American Bank, that had financed Turco's paint factory operations.8 0
The district court dismissed the Mirabiles' claims against American
Bank.8 ' The Mirabiles argued unsuccessfully that American Bank was lia-
ble for cleanup costs because it had participated in Turco's management dur-
ing the contamination, and because it was a prior owner of the property.1
2
72. See Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. at 960. The Mirabile court weighed the policy implica-
tions of this more restrictive view of the level of participation in management afforded by the
secured creditor exemption. See Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996 (noting
that imposition of liability on secured creditors enhances the government's chance of being
reimbursed for cleanup costs and would also help ensure more responsible management of
hazardous waste facilities).
73. See Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996; Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at
558-59.
74. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
75. Id. at 20,996.
76. Id. at 20,993.
77. Id.
78. Id. Consolidating these drums in the warehouse did not increase or decrease the ex-
isting health risks posed by the chemical drums. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 20,995.
81. Id. at 20,996. The court also dismissed American Bank's third party claim against the
Small Business Administration (SBA) because the SBA had not exercised managerial control
over Turco. Id. at 20,997.
82. Id. at 20,996.
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The court concluded that American Bank did not participate in Turco's
management to the degree necessary to remove it from the protection of the
secured creditor exemption.13 Specifically, the court found that American
Bank did not become involved "in the nuts and bolts day-to-day production
aspects of the business, ''8 4 and that "general financial participation" was an
insufficient predicate to CERCLA liability. The court concluded that Amer-
ican Bank would have participated in Turco's management to a degree to
remove it from the protection of the secured creditor exemption only if it
had become responsible for "operational, production, or waste disposal
activities."8"
The court also concluded that American Bank had not become the
"owner" at foreclosure.8 6 The court accepted American Bank's argument
that its foreclosure represented no more than an on-going effort to "protect
its security interest."87 Therefore, in this court's view, the bank's conduct
was consistent with the underlying purpose of the secured creditor exemp-
tion.88 The court did not determine, however, whether the foreclosure
vested American Bank with ownership as defined by CERCLA.8 9
The court explicitly rejected the Mirabiles' policy-based arguments in
favor of including lenders that have foreclosed within the definition of an
"owner and operator."'  The court acknowledged that "imposition of liabil-
83. Id. The court declined to address the question of whether American Bank's successful
bid at foreclosure, without more, brought American Bank within the definition of an "owner"
under CERCLA. Id. The court did not reach this issue because doing so was unnecessary, as
it had already concluded that the creditor's conduct was within the permissible scope of partic-
ipation in management protected by the secured creditor exemption. Id.
84. Id. at 20,995 ("Mere financial ability to control waste disposal practices of the sort
possessed by the secured creditors in this case is not ... sufficient for the imposition of
liability.").
85. Id. The court relied on the legislative history of the definition of "operator" to sup-
port this conclusion. The district court judge quoted the following passage from the legislative
history of a bill ultimately incorporated into CERCLA: "In the case of the facility an 'opera-
tor' is defined to be a person who is carrying out operational functions for the owner of the
facility pursuant to an appropriate agreement." Id. at 20,996 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 172,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160, 6180). Some have ar-
gued that a person must be both an owner and an operator to incur liability under
§ 9607(a)(2). Other courts have uniformly rejected this proposition. See United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 n.3 (11 th Cir. 1990) (identifying courts that have adopted
this interpretation), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
86. Id. at 20,994.
87. Id. at 20,996. Interestingly, the court acknowledged that a different rule might be
appropriate where a secured creditor finances the business operation of an entity solely in-
volved in the hazardous waste disposal business. Id. n.5.
88. Id.; see also text accompanying infra note 92.
89. Id.
90. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
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ity on secured creditors or lending institutions would enhance the govern-
ment's chances of recovering its cleanup costs, given the fact that owners
and operators of hazardous waste sites are often elusive, defunct, or other-
wise judgment proof."9 ' Nevertheless, the court concluded that Congress
had unambiguously provided a means by which secured creditors, such as
American Bank, could protect themselves from liability under CERCLA-
by holding indicia of ownership to protect a security interest without partici-
pating in management activities-and that American Bank had done just
that.
92
Not all of Turco's former lenders fared as well as American Bank. The
court refused to dismiss the complaint against Mellon Bank because it's in-
volvement in Turco's business was more substantial than that of American
Bank. 93 The court observed that some of Mellon Bank's activities did not
give rise to liability. 94 These "non-participatory" activities included "moni-
toring the cash collateral accounts, ensuring that receivables went to the
proper account, and establishing a reporting system between [Turco] and the
bank."9 5 Yet, the court found that some of the bank's actions could be con-
strued as participation in management.9 6 The activities giving rise to Mel-
lon Bank's potential "participation in management" included ordering
manufacturing procedure changes, weekly visits to the Turco factory, order-
ing certain personnel changes, and determining which supply orders would
be filled. 97 The court noted that because important factual issues existed
regarding the scope of Mellon Bank's participation in Turco's operations,
summary judgment was inappropriate."
91. Id. This recitation of the policy justifications for imposing liability on secured credi-
tors is incomplete. It ignores the problem that a lender can withhold foreclosing until the EPA
has stepped in to clean up the property, thus ensuring the undiminished value of the collateral
and allowing the creditor to reap a windfall at taxpayer expense. See United States v. Mary-
land Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md. 1986). The court also ignores the
generally accepted principle underlying CERCLA that those who profit from pollution will be
liable for remedial costs. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, this court ignores the role of secured creditors in CERCLA's enforcement structure.
92. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Env't L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,996 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 4, 1985).





98. Id. The court was skeptical whether these activities constituted participation in the
management of Turco: "[T]he reed upon which the Mirabiles seek to impose liability on Mel-
lon is slender indeed; however .... [there are nonetheless genuine issues of fact whether Mellon
Bank] engaged in the sort of participation in management which would bring a secured credi-
tor within the scope of CERCLA liability." Id.
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2. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.: Emphasizing the
Negative Consequences of Creating a Safe-Harbor for Secured
Creditors
In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co. , the secured creditor
was held liable for CERCLA cleanup costs amounting to nearly four times
the amount of its loan." In 1980, Maryland Bank financed the acquisition
of a landfill in which hazardous wastes had been improperly dumped. 1'
The borrower defaulted on the loan and Maryland Bank foreclosed on the
property in May, 1982.102 A year later, local environmental authorities
learned about the hazardous substances on the property.'0 3 The EPA, after
cleaning the property, sought reimbursement from the bank for its cleanup
costs. 104
Maryland Bank disputed its liability for the cleanup costs and refused to
reimburse the EPA. The government sued and each side sought summary
judgment on the issue of liability.' 05 The bank raised three arguments in
support of its motion for summary judgment. First, the bank argued that
the term "owner and operator" is properly read in the conjunctive and there-
fore only imposes liability on persons whose conduct involves both owner-
ship and operation. The court examined CERCLA's legislative history and
held that either ownership or operation was a sufficient basis upon which to
impose liability.'0 6 CERCLA defines "operator" as someone "who carries
out operational functions for the owner of the facility."'0 7 The court ob-
served that, by definition, an "operator" could not be the same person as an
"owner."' 1 8 Thus, the court concluded that the phrase "owner and opera-
tor" should be construed in the disjunctive.
99. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
100. Id. at 582.
101. Id. at 575.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. The ensuing EPA cleanup cost $550,000 and necessitated the removal of 237 drums of
toxic chemicals and 1,180 tons of contaminated soil. Id. at 575-76.
105. Id. at 576.
106. Id. at 577.
107. Id. at 578 (citing H.R. REP. No. 85, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6182).
108. Confusion over this issue stems in large part from the fact that the statute refers to
"owner or operator" in the definitional section and "owner and operator" in the section identi-
fying who will be subject to liability. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) with § 9607(a)(1) (empha-
ses added). Construction of the term "owner and operator" used in § 9607(a)(1) in the
disjunctive is now well-established. See, e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d
1550, 1554 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991); New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985); Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle
County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (D. Del. 1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988).
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Next, Maryland Bank argued that foreclosure was undertaken solely to
"protect its security interest" and was therefore protected by the secured
creditor exemption. The court rejected this argument as well.
The [secured creditor] exemption covers only those persons who,
at the time of the clean-up, hold indicia of ownership to protect a
then-held security interest in the land. The verb tense of the exclu-
sionary language is critical. The security interest must exist at the
time of the clean-up. The mortgage held by [the bank] (the secur-
ity interest) terminated at the foreclosure sale . . ., at which time it
ripened into full title.' °9
The court reasoned that the purpose of the exemption was to protect persons
holding mortgages in those states which adhere to the title-theory of mort-
gages."' Therefore, the court concluded that the phrase "primarily to pro-
tect the security interest" exempted only those mortgagees who, under the
law in title-theory states, were deemed to hold actual title to the property
simply by virtue of their status as mortgagees."l'
Finally, Maryland Bank argued that Mirabile, which allowed the secured
creditor to assign its winning bid in foreclosure without incurring liability as
the property owner at the time of the cleanup, should be controlling. 12 The
district court disagreed. The court first distinguished Mirabile by noting
that American Bank assigned its title taken at foreclosure to a third party
within four months of the foreclosure, whereas Maryland Bank held title to
the property for over four years.' 13 The court then expressed its overall
109. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579.
110. Id. at 579. Not all commentators agree with the Maryland Bank court's conclusion
that the purpose of the secured creditor exemption is to protect secured creditors doing busi-
ness in title theory states.
The ... court's restriction of the security interest exemption makes it a virtual nul-
lity. Under the court's interpretation, only mortgagees in thirteen states have some
limited protection. Presumably, mortgagees in other states and secured creditors
holding security other than a mortgage have no protection under CERCLA. Since a
security interest is a present property interest in the collateral, pursuant to the court's
reasoning, any individual holding a mortgage in thirty-seven states and other secured
creditors are potentially liable as "owners."
Burcat, supra note 57, at 534 (footnote omitted). But see Burkhart, supra note 2, at 338 (agree-
ing with the Maryland Bank court that the purpose of the secured creditor exemption is "to
ensure that mortgage holders are treated similarly under [CERCLA] despite differing state law
treatments of the interests created by a mortgage"); Note, Cleaning Up the Debris After Fleet
Factors: Lender Liability and CERCLA's Security Interest Exemption, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1249, 1258-63 (1991).
111. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579 n.5, 580 (noting, but not wholly endors-
ing, the view that the length of time which title is held may have an effect on whether foreclo-
sure is an act designed to protect one's security interest).
112. Id. at 580.
113. Id. at 579 n.5.
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disapproval of the result reached in Mirabile.1 14 For example, the court ob-
served that allowing foreclosure without triggering liability would "convert
CERCLA into an insurance scheme for financial institutions." ' 15 A secured
creditor collateralizing a loan with contaminated property, the court rea-
soned, could foreclose and wait for the government to step in and clean it up,
thereby ensuring no diminution in the value of its collateral. The court
deemed such a result counterintuitive. Moreover, the Maryland Bank court
asserted that the secured creditor exemption did not need a judicially-cre-
ated foreclosure loophole to satisfy the creditor's desire to avoid liability.
Mortgagees, the court observed, could readily protect themselves from liabil-
ity by investigating and discovering potential environmental problems before
agreeing to make the loan in the first place.' 
1 6
114. Id. at 580 ("the legislative history and policies behind the Act counsel against such a
generous reading of section 101(20)(A)'s exclusion").
115. Id.
116. Id. ("CERCLA will not absolve [creditors] of their responsibility for their mistakes of
judgment."). The court explained that "[flinancial institutions are in a position to investigate
and discover potential problems in their secured properties. For many lending institutions
such research is routine." Id. This observation is accurate in only a limited sense. The term
"research," as it is used by the court, is misleading because there is no standard for "appropri-
ateness" of that research. Discussion of the effectiveness of, and the legal effect of, conducting
an environmental audit is beyond the scope of this Note. Generally, however, environmental
engineers perform one of two different kinds of environmental audits: the "pure-test environ-
mental audit" and the "phase I environmental audit." The pure-test environmental audit in-
volves the random drilling of test wells on a property. See Mauch, supra note 49, at 775.
Engineers remove soil and groundwater samples and test them for any one of a "standard"
group of contaminants. Id. The Phase I environmental audit cannot be similarly defined be-
cause "the scope of the service still varies substantially from firm to firm." Id. Phase I "refers
to a methodology according to which the investigation is conducted in multiple phases." Id. at
745-46 & n. 17. The first phase of the investigation
is a broad-based investigation of available information about the history, uses, and
general condition of the property, and each successive phase is a more specific inves-
tigation of conditions indicated in the earlier phases. The more specific investigation
conducted in later phases is pursued until the suspect conditions are either confirmed
or determined not to constitute a threat, within a given degree of certainty.
Id. at 746; see also Ronald D. Miller & Mark J. Bennett, Government Records: An Essential
Element of Environmental Due Diligence, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 920 (Dec. 21,
1988). Both tests have been subject to criticism centering on their effectiveness for ascertaining
the condition of the property. See, e.g., Mauch, supra note 49, at 775. For example, pure-test
environmental audits test for only a small fraction of substances for which a purchaser could
be held liable under CERCLA. Id. Moreover, according to one critic, the results are "only
useful for the particular cubic yard of property from which the sample was taken." Id.
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3. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co.: Splitting the Difference
Between Mirabile and Maryland Bank & Trust
Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Manufacturing Co." 7 stemmed from
the illegal disposal of hazardous substances on a manufacturing site owned
by BFG Electroplating and Manufacturing Co. (BFG)." l BFG sued cur-
rent and former owners, as well as a bank that had financed the former
owner's manufacturing operations on an adjacent property, after the con-
tamination was discovered." 9 The bank, National Bank of the Common-
wealth (National Bank), foreclosed on the adjacent property and held title
for eight months.' 20
The court analyzed National Bank's potential CERCLA liability chrono-
logically, noting that there were two relevant time periods-the period when
National Bank held a mortgage on the property and the period when Na-
tional Bank held title to the property-in its inquiry.' 2 ' As to the pre-fore-
closure period, the court held that CERCLA exempts a lender from liability
so long as it does not participate in the management or operation of the
facility.' 2 2 During this period, National Bank advanced numerous lines of
credit secured by the property and/or the borrower's accounts receivable,' 2 3
received periodic financial statements from the borrower,' 2 4 and met with
the borrower's executives on several occasions after the borrower defaulted.
During the meetings, the bank was given information on the status of the
borrower's accounts, personnel changes, and raw material availability.' 2 In
addition, National Bank officials "actively assisted" in seeking Small Busi-
ness Administration (SBA) financing for the borrower and initiated contacts
with local officials "in an effort to assist [the debtor] with wastewater dis-
charge compliance.126 The bank also inspected the property and contrib-
uted half of the $20,000 cost of removing twenty drums of toxic chemicals
stored on the property.' 2 7 Finally, National Bank found a lessee for the
propety after the debtor ceased its manufacturing operations.'2 '
117. 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
118. Id. at 557.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 559.
121. Id. at 561-63.
122. Id. at 561.




127. Id. at 560.
128. Id. at 559-60.
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The court concluded that the bank's pre-foreclosure activities were insuffi-
cient to constitute "participation in the management or operation of the fa-
cility.' 129 The court explained that there was "no evidence suggesting that
the Bank controlled operational, production or waste disposal activities at
the... [p]roperty."' 3° The court reasoned that a fundamental goal under-
lying CERCLA is promoting the "safe handling and disposal of hazardous
waste." 3' The court believed that setting a low threshold of what consti-
tutes "participation in management" would have a significant negative im-
pact; it would deter creditors from closely monitoring environmental aspects
of their borrowers' operations so as to avoid potential CERCLA liability. 
13 2
The court observed that in order to "encourage banks to monitor a debtor's
use of security property, a high liability threshold [was appropriate because
it would] enhance the dual purposes of protecting the bank's investments
and promoting CERCLA's policy goals."
133
The court, however, held that the bank became liable as the property
"owner" when it foreclosed.1 3 ' The court considered the divergent prece-
dents of Mirabile and Maryland Bank. Maryland Bank held that after a
lender forecloses on a property, the secured creditor exemption no longer
applies. 35 The Mirabile court, however, concluded that foreclosure does
not end the exemption's protection if it represents no more than a continuing
effort by a lender to protect its security interest. 136 The Guidice court con-
cluded that Maryland Bank was more persuasively reasoned.' 37 The court
observed that the 1986 amendments to CERCLA supported the "narrow
reading" of the secured creditor exemption adopted in Maryland Bank. 
38
129. Id. at 562.
130. Id. This statement indicates a lack of precision in the court's analysis of this issue.
The court equates the conduct that constitutes operation with the conduct that constitutes
participation in the management of the facility. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901
F.2d 1550, 1556 n.6 (1 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 752 (1991). The court's construc-
tion renders CERCLA's distinction between "operators" and "owners that participate in man-
agement" superfluous.
131. Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 562.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 562-63 (holding the secured creditor liable because "an exemption for landown-
ing lenders would create a special class of otherwise liable landowners, and [because of] the
failure of the 1986 amendments to specifically exempt mortgagees-turned-landowners").
135. Id.
136. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,996 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 4, 1985).
137. Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 563.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1988). Courts have noted that Congress's failure to amend
the secured creditor exemption when it enacted SARA supports the conclusion that Congress
intended to make lenders that foreclose on contaminated property liable for cleanup costs.
Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 563.
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The court reasoned that the fact that post-Maryland Bank amendments "did
not simultaneously amend the statute to exclude from liability lenders who
acquire property through foreclosure might indicate that Congress intended
to hold them liable as owners."' 3 9 The court further reasoned that failure to
hold the title holder liable would "frustrate the distribution of clean-up costs
achieved by CERCLA as well as reallocate the risks assumed in owning real
property." '4o
The unsettled state of this important area of law provided fertile ground
for the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Fleet Factors.
II. FLEET FACTORS-THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO
SECURED CREDITOR LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
The Eleventh Circuit suggested that to determine Fleet's liability under
CERCLA it must assess whether Fleet was the current "owner or operator"
of the SPW facility within the meaning of CERCLA § 9607(a)(1)," 4 ' and
139. Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 563.
140. Id. But see In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
a current owner is not liable for cleanup costs when it only held title to the property to secure
performance of its debtor's obligations). A local government authority owned the property at
issue in Bergsoe. Id. at 669-70. The government agreed to sell the property to Bergsoe Metal
and support the company's attempt to finance a lead recycling operation on the property by
issuing industrial revenue bonds. Id. at 670. The transaction involved a sale-leaseback of the
property to the government. Id. The facts amply demonstrate that the local authority was not
involved in the project other than in facilitating the original bond financing. Id. at 671-72.
The court construed the decision in Fleet Factors as requiring a secured creditor to participate
in some way in the management of the facility before a secured creditor is removed from the
protection of the exemption. Id. at 672. The Ninth Circuit refused to hold the local govern-
ment liable for cleanup costs because the court agreed that some level of participation in the
management of a facility must exist before liability as an owner arises. Id. at 672-73 ("What is
critical is not what rights the Port had, but what it did. The CERCLA security interest excep-
tion uses the active 'participating in management.' Regardless of what rights the Port may
have had, it cannot have participated in management if it never exercised them."); see also
Holding Indicia of Ownership in Facility Does Not Establish CERCLA Liability, Court Says, 21
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 788 (Aug. 17, 1990) (discussing Bergsoe Metal holding).
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988). The district court rejected the government's claim
that Fleet was liable as the present owner of the facility. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.,
724 F. Supp. 955, 960 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 901 F.2d. 1550 (1 1th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991). The circuit court agreed. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at
1554-55. Detailed discussion of the law under this provision of CERCLA is beyond the scope
of this Note. The circuit court construed this section of CERCLA to target the owner of the
facility at the time that the cost recovery action is filed by the government. Id. at 1554. On the
date that the government filed this action the facility was owned by the county government.
Id. at 1553. CERCLA provides, however, that in the event the property is acquired by a
governmental entity due to foreclosure, abandonment, tax delinquency or bankruptcy, then
"any person who owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at the facility immediately
beforehand" will be liable as the current owner for the purposes of § 9607(a)(1). 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(20)(A)(iii). The circuit court noted that the facility was in fact "owned" by the
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whether Fleet was the "owner or operator" at the time the hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of within the meaning of CERCLA § 9607(a)(2).
142
An affirmative response to either question would be sufficient to hold Fleet
liable for the EPA's full costs for cleaning up the SPW property. 143 The
district court, on cross motions for summary judgment, held that Fleet was
not the current "owner or operator" of the facility.' 44 The district court,
however, refused to grant Fleet summary judgment on its liability as an
"owner" at the time of the disposal of the hazardous substances by SPW.
The trial court concluded that disputed factual issues regarding Fleet's par-
ticipation in SPW's management had to be resolved in order to determine
whether Fleet stepped outside of the protection of the secured creditor ex-
emption. 145 Both parties appealed. 1
4 6
A. Fleet's Liability as the "Current Owner" of the SPW Facility
Section 9607(a)(1) of CERCLA imposes liability for cleanup costs on per-
sons "owning or operating [the contaminated] facility."' 147  The circuit
court, affirming the district court, held that the individual who owns or oper-
debtor's trustee in bankruptcy prior to the county's acquisition of the property and therefore
that Fleet did not fall within the reach of CERCLA's use of the term "current owner and
operator." Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1555.
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
143. See, e.g., Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp.
1269, 1280 (D. Del. 1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating
& Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
144. Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. at 960. The district court adopted a somewhat more re-
strictive view of the level of participation in a debtor's affairs than Mirabile or Guidice in
reaching the conclusion that Fleet had not participated in the management of the SPW facility.
See supra notes 96-100. The court summarized its construction of the conduct permitted
under the secured creditor exemption as follows:
[the phrase 'participation in management'] permit[s] secured creditors to provide fi-
nancial assistance and general, and even isolated instances of specific, management
advice to its debtors without risking CERCLA liability if the secured creditor does
not participate in the day-to-day management of the business or facility either before
or after the business ceases operation.
Id. at 960 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988)).
145. Id. at 961.
146. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1554.
147. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii)); see also supra note 55 (defining "facility").
Fleet unsuccessfully argued that the issue of its liability under this section of CERCLA had
not been appealed by the government and therefore was not properly before the circuit court.
Id. at 1554 n.2. The court dismissed this argument based on the lower court's certification of
its order. Id. The court noted that the Supreme Court has held that the effect of an interlocu-
tory appeal is to bring the entire lower court order before the appellate court, not merely the
specific question certified. Id. (citing United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 676-77 (1987)).
Moreover, the circuit court, reprinting the lower court's certification, concluded that Fleet's
liability under this section was one of the issues specifically certified for its review. Id.
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ates a contaminated property on the date the government files a complaint to
recover cleanup costs is liable under this section of CERCLA."4 ' The
county government, not Fleet, owned the SPW plant on the date the govern-
ment filed its complaint. 149 The county government, however, was exempt
from CERCLA liability under a special exclusion applicable to governmen-
tal entities that "involuntarily" acquire contaminated property.15 ° The spe-
cial exclusion shifts liability to the "person who owned, operated or
otherwise controlled activities at [the] facility immediately beforehand.''""
The SPW trustee-in-bankruptcy held title to the SPW facility prior to the
county. 152 Fleet was not involved in the facility from the time the trustee
acquired title until the county foreclosed.15 3 The Eleventh Circuit inter-
preted the words "immediately beforehand" to mean "without intervening
ownership, operation, and control."' 54 The circuit court, affirming the dis-
trict court, held that Fleet could not be held liable as the "current owner" as
a result of the trustee's intervening ownership.' 55
B. Fleet's Liability as the Owner of the SPW Facility at the Time of the
Disposal of Hazardous Substances
Section 9607(a)(2) of CERCLA imposes liability on a secured creditor if
he is the "owner" or "operator" of the property when hazardous substances
are improperly disposed. 5 6 The circuit court concluded that Fleet's con-
duct, as alleged by the government, was sufficient to hold Fleet liable as an
''owner.'' 57 First, the court determined that Fleet was in fact an "owner" of
148. Id. at 1554.
149. Id. at 1555. The county acquired title to the property two days earlier at a foreclosure
sale resulting from SPW's failure to pay state and county taxes. Id. at 1553.
150. Id. at 1555 n.4. Involuntary means that "title or control of ... [a facility is] conveyed
due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of
State or local government." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii).




155. Id. The court reasoned that even though trustee may not have controlled the facility
during this intervening three-year period, the trustee could not now delegate to Fleet its re-
sponsibility under CERCLA simply because of its lack of involvement at the property. Id.
The court further justified its narrow construction of the words "immediately beforehand" in
part on the fact that this construction neither "tortured" the plain statutory meaning of the
words nor created a loophole by which responsible parties could evade liability. Id. at 1555
n.5.
156. Id. at 1554, 1556 n.6. Liability extends to conduct in two time frames: the present
(i.e., when the cost recovery action is filed) and the past (i.e., when the illegal disposal oc-
curred). See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
157. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1556 n.6. The court concluded that Fleet could also be held
liable as an "operator," but that any discussion of this basis of liability would be omitted as an
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the contaminated SPW plant. Next, the court concluded that the secured
creditor exemption did not shield Fleet from cleanup liability.
The Eleventh Circuit endorsed the government's argument that Fleet was
liable under § 9607(a)(2). 5 s The government argued, in part, that Fleet was
liable because it "owned" the property (i.e., it held indicia of ownership in
the property and managed it to an extent rendering the secured creditor ex-
emption inapplicable).' 59 The court concluded that the government alleged
facts sufficient to hold Fleet liable on this basis."6 The court found that
Fleet qualified as an "owner" because it undisputedly held "indicia of own-
ership," in the form of its deed of trust on the SPW plant, when hazardous
substances were improperly disposed. 16' The court then examined the scope
of the secured creditor exemption; that is, it defined the range of conduct
that constitutes "participat[ion] in the management."'
162
The EPA and Fleet argued for drastically different constructions of the
phrase "participate in the management." The government urged a strict in-
terpretation of the phrase and argued that a creditor may not engage in the
management of a facility in any way and still remain within the exemption's
protection.163 Fleet, on the other hand, argued for a more liberal construc-
tion, one that distinguished between permissible and impermissible types of
participatory conduct.I64 Fleet suggested that, under the exemption, partici-
pation in the financial management of a facility should be permissible, but
that participation in the day-to-day or operational affairs should be imper-
missible.' 65 The court rejected both proffered constructions. It explained
that the government's formulation would "largely eviscerate the exemption
Congress intended to afford to secured creditors."' 166 Similarly, the con-
struction advanced by Fleet, based on the decision in United States v.
overly repetitive discussion of Fleet's ownership-based liability. Id. The court, however, was
not willing to hold that an allegation of facts sufficient to establish liability as an "owner" will
universally also establish a party's liability as an "operator." Id.
158. Id. at 1556 n.6.
159. Id. The court thus laid the groundwork early in its opinion for a holding that the
scope of activities encompassed within the term "operate" and those encompassed within the
phrase "participate in the management" are not coextensive. The court noted that the facts
establishing participation in management can, but will not always, be different from those
indicating operation. Id.
160. Id.
161. See infra text accompanying note 175.
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Mirabile, was too permissive and undermined CERCLA's broad remedial
goals. 167
1. The Eleventh Circuit's Analysis of the Parties' Arguments and
Rejection of the Mirabile Holding
The Eleventh Circuit examined and rejected the construction of the se-
cured creditor exemption adopted in Mirabile.168 The Mirabile court con-
cluded that "before a secured creditor ... may be held liable, it must, at a
minimum, participate in the day-to-day operational aspects of the site."'
169
The Eleventh Circuit found this construction too permissive in light of the
"overwhelmingly remedial" goal of the CERCLA statutory scheme.' 70 The
circuit court reasoned that CERCLA's remedial design, applying traditional
rules of statutory construction, mandated a narrow reading of the statute's
ambiguous terms and therefore required a reversal of the district court's
equally permissive construction of the exemption.' 7' The district court's
reading of the exemption, according to the Eleventh Circuit, "essentially re-
quired a secured creditor to be involved in the operations of a facility in
order to incur liability."' 72 The circuit court rejected this interpretation of
the exemption because it erroneously assumed that "operation" and "partici-
pate in the management" encompass the same types of participatory con-
167. Id. at 1556-57. This formulation was adopted below by the district court. Id. at 1557.
168. Id. at 1556.
169. Id. (omission in original) (quoting United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,996 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985)). The circuit court noted that the construc-
tion of the secured creditor exemption adopted by the Mirabile court had the effect of permit-
ting a secured creditor to foreclose on the property and take prudent and routine steps to
secure the property against depreciation. Id. Specifically, the Mirabile court would allow a
creditor to engage in the following activities without removing itself from the protection-of the
secured creditor exemption: secure the property against vandalism, inquire into the cost of
removing drums of hazardous chemicals, monitor the debtor's cash collateral accounts, ensure
proper accounting of the debtor's receivables, and establish a reporting system between the
bank and debtor. Id. at 1556 n.7. The circuit court summarized the Mirabile court's list of
potentially impermissible activities as including determining which customers would receive
their orders, requiring additional production from the debtor's facility, supervising facility op-
erations, or requiring changes in the manufacturing process or plant personnel. Id.
170. Id. at 1557 (citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313,
1317 (1 1th Cir. 1990); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d
726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987)). The circuit court explicitly re-
jected the Mirabile court's formulation of the secured creditor exemption later in its opinion.
See Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.
171. Id. at 1557. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the result, a refusal to dismiss the govern-
ment action against Fleet, but not the reasoning employed by the district court in reaching it.
Id. at 1557, 1559.
172. Id. at 1557.
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duct. The court explained that CERCLA explicitly imposes liability on
persons engaged in operational activities, as distinct from the imposition of
liability on owners.174 Owners, as a distinct class, instead are "liable if they
participate in the management of a facility."""5 The circuit court concluded
that it was counterintuitive, as well as contrary to the plain meaning of
"owner," to conclude that Congress intended both terms to encompass the
same range of conduct.
2. The Secured Creditor Exemption: Imposing Liability for Low-Level
Participatory Conduct
Having rejected the district court's attempt to equate "operation" and
"participat[ion] in the management," the circuit court advanced its own con-
struction of these key terms. 176 The court held that a secured creditor
would incur liability under § 9607(a)(2) "without being an operator, by par-
ticipating in the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a
capacity to influence the [debtor's] treatment of hazardous wastes."' 177 The
court explained that a creditor's "capacity to influence" its debtor's hazard-
ous waste treatment activities should be "inferred from the extent of [the
creditor's] involvement in the facility's financial management. ' 78 Thus, to
be held liable for cleanup costs, a creditor need not go as far as to engage in
activities that could also give rise to liability as an "operator." 179 Nor does a
creditor have to "participate in management decisions relating to hazardous
waste" to be liable.180 Instead, "a secured creditor will be held liable if its
involvement with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to sup-
port the inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it
so chose."' 8 '
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. Id.
177. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The court cited United States v. Kayser-
Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 22-23 (D.R.I. 1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991), as an example of the kind of activity that would subject a
creditor to liability as an "operator" of a hazardous waste facility. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at
1557 n.10.
178. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1559 n.13. This explanation was offered by the court in the
context of a discussion of Fleet's actual involvement in the financial management of the SPW
facility. Id. at 1559.
179. Id. at 1557. The court did add, however, that such conduct would lead to loss of the
protection of the secured creditor exemption. Id. at 1557-58.
180. Id. at 1558.
181. Id.
[Vol. 41:211
Secured Creditor CERCLA Liability
The Eleventh Circuit turned to CERCLA's legislative history in support
of its narrow construction of the secured creditor exemption." 2 The court
concluded that the exemption was added to the legislation to avoid imposi-
tion of liability on persons holding title to contaminated property who had
not participated in the "managment or operation and were not otherwise af-
filiated with the person leasing or operating the.., facility." ' 3 The court
reasoned that use of the word "affiliated" explained "the threshold at which
a secured creditor becomes liable" and concluded that this language "clearly
indicate[d]" Congress's intent to impose liability on owners for "a more pe-
ripheral degree of involvement with the affairs of a facility than that neces-
sary to be held liable as an operator."'
8 4
3. The Eleventh Circuit's Policy-based Justifications for Its Construction
of the Secured Creditor Exemption
The Eleventh Circuit also supported its narrow construction of the se-
cured creditor exemption on three policy-based grounds. First, the court
noted that its decision would not unduly hinder commercial lending prac-
tices because it allowed creditors to engage in traditional activities vis a vis
their debtors. For example, the court suggested that its construction of the
secured creditor exemption allows a creditor to "monitor" any aspect of the
debtor's business and become involved in "occasional and discrete financial
decisions relating to the protection of its security interest."'18 1 In this regard,
the court believed it had adopted a construction of the exemption that was a
compromise between the equally inappropriate constructions urged by the
EPA and by Fleet.
1 86
Second, the court concluded that its construction of the secured creditor
exemption would encourage creditors to fully investigate the hazardous
waste treatment policies and practices of prospective debtors. 8 7 The court
envisioned two benefits flowing from encouraging investigation into these
matters. First, the circuit court emphasized that secured creditors, knowing
the potential risks of a given transaction, would be able to reflect those risks
in the terms of the transaction (e.g., by altering the interest rate or collateral
requirements). Thus, in the court's view, its holding would not subject cred-
182. Id. at 1558 n.l (quoting remarks of Rep. Harsha).
183. Id.
184. Id.




Catholic University Law Review
itors to a greater risk of CERCLA liability than they had bargained for.'8 s
Second, the court emphasized that debtors would, in turn, be given an incen-
tive to employ safe hazardous waste disposal practices because failure to do
so would adversely affect their loan terms.' 9
Third, the court asserted that its construction of the secured creditor ex-
emption would facilitate the cleanup process mandated by CERCLA. Ac-
cording to the court, its decision would encourage creditors to monitor their
debtors' hazardous waste disposal activities and "insist upon compliance
with acceptable treatment standards as a prerequisite to continued and fu-
ture financial support."' 90 Moreover, the court reasoned, creditors who be-
came excessively involved in the management of a hazardous waste facility
would have a strong incentive to remedy, rather than ignore, existing haz-
ardous conditions. 9' The court anticipated and rejected criticism that its
construction of the secured creditor exemption would hinder, rather than
facilitate, cleanup activities.' 92 For example, some critics have complained
that creditors fearing CERCLA liability will simply not participate in trans-
actions involving contaminated, or potentially contaminated, collateral.
193
Without financing, these critics suggest, polluted land cannot be cleaned up.
The court discounted the likelihood of such a result. It responded that, be-
cause creditors can weigh the risk of liability into the terms of the transac-
tion, its construction of the exemption would not impede transactions
involving potential cleanup liability.194
4. The Eleventh Circuit's Analysis of Fleet's Participation in the
Management of the SPW Facility
The Eleventh Circuit held that the government alleged conduct sufficient
to remove Fleet from the protection of the secured creditor exemption. The
188. Id. The court was in full agreement with the observation made in United States v.
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986), that the implications of con-
struing the secured creditor exemption to create an unqualified exemption for creditors was
unnecessary. Id. at 1559 (stating that the exemption was not designed to create "an insurance
scheme for financial institutions, protecting them against possible losses due to the security for
loans with polluted properties. Mortgagees [have] the means to protect themselves, by making
prudent loans") (quoting Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 580).
189. Id. at 1558; see also United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,992, 20,996 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (noting that imposing liability on secured creditors
"may well ... help to ensure more responsible management of [hazardous waste] sites").
190. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.
191. Id. at 1558-59.
192. Id. at 1558.
193. Id. (citing United States v. Guidice, 732 F. Supp. 556, 562 (W.D. Pa. 1989); Tom,
supra note 57, at 928, 944).
194. Id.
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court arrived at this conclusion after it examined Fleet's interaction with
SPW during three time periods: (1) from 1976 (when Fleet began making
loans to SPW) to February, 1981 (when SPW ceased operations); (2) from
February, 1981 (when SPW ceased operations) to June, 1982 (the date of
Fleet's foreclosure on its security interest in SPW's inventory and equip-
ment); and (3) from June, 1982 (the date of Fleet's foreclosure) to December,
1983 (the time when Fleet's contractors responsible for the removal of left-
over equipment left the SPW facility).
The court found that Fleet's conduct during the first period did not sub-
ject it to liability under § 9607(a)(2). Fleet merely advanced to SPW funds
collaterized by assignments of SPW's accounts receivable, paid SPW's utili-
ties, and later informed SPW that it would not continue to advance addi-
tional funds because of the declining value of SPW's collateral. 95 The
secured creditor exemption protects these types of involvement in the debt-
ors' affairs.
1 96
The court found that Fleet's conduct during the second period, after SPW
ceased operations but prior to its foreclosure on its security interest, did con-
stitute "participat[ion] in the management" and thus triggered liability. 197
During this period, Fleet required SPW to obtain its approval before ship-
ping its goods to customers; established the price for excess inventory; dic-
tated when and to whom the finished goods should be shipped; determined
when employees should be laid off; supervised the activity of the office ad-
ministrator at the site; received and processed SPW's employment and tax
forms; controlled access to the SPW facility; and contracted with a third
party to dispose of fixtures and equipment at the SPW facility. 198 The court
concluded Fleet had "pervasive, if not complete" involvement in the finan-
cial management of the SPW facility during this period.199
The court also found that Fleet's conduct during the third period, the
period after it foreclosed on the equipment and inventory, constituted at
least "participat[ion] in the management," if not, "operation." 2" Fleet con-
tended that auctioning SPW's inventory, equipment and fixtures was con-




199. Id. The court also briefly addressed the government's allegation that Fleet was in-
volved in the operational management of the facility. Id. The court held that either the allega-
tion of Fleet's involvement in the financial management of SPW, or the allegation of Fleet's
involvement in the operational management of SPW, were sufficient as a matter of law to
withstand Fleet's motion for summary judgment. Id.
200. Id. at 1559-60 & n.15.
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duct designed to protect its security interest." The court disagreed and
observed that "[t]he scope of the secured creditor exemption is not deter-
mined by whether the creditor's activity was taken to protect its security
interest., 20 2 Thus, courts deciding whether a secured creditor's conduct
falls within the ambit of the secured creditor exemption must focus on the
extent of the secured creditor's participation in the management of the prop-
erty, not the creditor's motive for doing so. To this end, the court com-
mented that "[t]o hold otherwise would enable secured creditors to take
indifferent and irresponsible actions toward their debtors' hazardous wastes
with impunity by incanting that they were protecting their security
interests."
20 3
III. FLEET FACTORS-VINDICATION OR EVISCERATION OF THE
SECURED CREDITOR EXEMPTION?
The key task confronting the Eleventh Circuit was to untangle and give
meaning to CERCLA's circular definition of the term "owner or opera-
tor." 2" The court recognized that its construction of the secured creditor
exemption must support the "'overwhelmingly remedial' goal of CER-
201. Id. at 1560. This argument won the day in Mirabile but failed in Maryland Bank &
Trust. Compare United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,996
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) with United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573,
579 (D. Md. 1986).
202. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1560 (emphasis added). The court was correcting a com-
mon misinterpretation of the phrase "primarily to protect his security interest." The secured
creditor exemption is easily misstated by equating the level of participation in management
tolerated under the definition of "owner or operator" as being circumscribed by conduct
designed to protect the security interest. See, e.g., Quentel, supra note 3, at 161 ("it is for a
court to determine when a lender is protecting its security interest and when it has crossed the
line into managing the facility"). The statute defines "owner" as excluding those persons who
hold indicia of ownership solely to protect security interest. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii)
(1988). Therefore, the phrase "primarily to protect his security interest" is no more than a
limitation on which holders of indicia of ownership will be protected by the secured creditor
exemption. A person who holds indicia of ownership for some reason other than protecting a
security interest is not entitled to the exemption's protection.
203. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1560.
204. See, e.g., Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 156 (7th
Cir. 1988) (holding that the circularity of the definition of "owner and operator" strongly
implies that the words should be given their ordinary, non-technical meanings); Artesian
Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (D. Del. 1987) (describing the use
of circular definitions in CERCLA generally), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988); United
States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,995 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985)
(describing the definition of "owner or operator," absent the secured creditor exemption, as a
"hopeless tautology").
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CLA's statutory scheme"2 °5 without simultaneously "eviscerat[ing] the ex-
emption."20 6 The opinion advances the case law on the secured creditor
exemption in three important respects. First, the opinion clarifies the rela-
tionship between the phrase "indicia of ownership" and the term "owner" in
the exemption. Next, the opinion advances a reasonable construction of the
phrase "participate in the management," a construction that balances the
competing interests of the government and secured creditors and clarifies
which activities the exemption encompasses. Finally, the opinion reinforces
the private enforcement mechanism Congress created when it chose not to
provide creditors with a blanket exemption from cleanup liability.
A. The Amorphous Relationship Between "Indicia of Ownership" and
"Owner" in Fleet Factors
The Eleventh Circuit held that Fleet was the "owner" of SPW's plant with
a nonchalance that belies the significance of this finding. Fleet never fore-
closed on the SPW plant.20 7 Fleet was not an owner in the sense that it held
actual title to the debtor's contaminated property. 2 8 Rather, Fleet held eq-
uitable title by virtue of being the beneficiary under a deed of trust to the
property. 2°9 The property interest in SPW's plant granted pursuant to the
deed of trust was "indicia of ownership., 20 The court simply stated, in a
footnote, that "Fleet can be held liable [as an owner] if it had an indicia of
ownership... and managed the facility to the extent necessary to remove it
from the secured creditor liability exemption. ' '2 t The critical conclusion
205. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557; see also United States v. New Castle County, 727 F.
Supp. 854, 859 (D. Del. 1989) (collecting cases in which CERCLA has been construed broadly
"to achieve its remedial purposes").
206. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1556.
207. Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. at 958.
208. Fleet did foreclose on the equipment and other personal property securing SPW's
debt. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1560 n.14. The court concluded that Fleet's conduct with
respect to the auctioning of this equipment was sufficient to remove Fleet from the protection
of the secured creditor exemption. Id. However, the court does not support this conclusion
based on the act of foreclosure; rather, it was based on the level of its involvement in the
facility in conducting the auction and other activities engaged in by Fleet after SPW ceased
operations. Id. at 1559-60. A security interest, within the meaning of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, is "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or perform-
ance of an obligation." U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1978). "A security interest is a property interest
that is more than a mere contractual right to payment of the debt secured. The security inter-
est is, in fact, a present property interest in the collateral." Burcat, supra note 57, at 524-25
(footnote omitted).
209. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1556.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1556 n.6. The Eleventh Circuit cited United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724
F. Supp. 15, 20-21 (D.R.I. 1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct.
957 (1991), in support of this proposition. Id. Kayser-Roth involved an action against the
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implicit in this finding is that, according to the Eleventh Circuit, indicia of
ownership constitutes ownership when determining who comprises the class
of persons who are "owners" of a facility. The court refused to hold that
foreclosure is a prerequisite to incurring liability by reason of being an
"'owner."
This conclusion conflicts with the holdings in Mirabile and Maryland
Bank. In Mirabile, the court held that title might not constitute ownership if
the creditor took title in foreclosure "to protect its security interest. ' '212 The
Maryland Bank court reached the opposite conclusion, holding instead that
foreclosure transformed a secured creditor into an "owner" irrespective of
whether the secured creditor's motive for foreclosing was "primarily to pro-
tect [its] security interest."'2 13 Maryland Bank also conflicts with Fleet Fac-
tors.2" 4 Applying the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning, the Maryland Bank
court should have concluded that foreclosure was not a prerequisite to own-
ership-based liability. The structure of the secured creditor exemption man-
dates the interpretation adopted by the Eleventh Circuit. Congress intended
persons who hold "indicia of ownership" to be encompassed within the
meaning of the term "owners."2 If Congress had not so intended, it could
have simply modified the definition of "owner or operator" to provide that
parent corporation of a defunct manufacturer for response costs incurred by the EPA in a
cleanup of the subsidiary's manufacturing facility. Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 17-19. The
court held that the parent corporation's stock ownership of its subsidiary constituted indicia of
ownership and therefore participation in the management of the subsidiary can subject the
parent corporation to liability as an "owner." Id. at 20-23. See generally Bert Black &
Michael G. Leveille, The Corporate Veil and CERCLA Liability, 4 Toxics L. Rep (BNA) No.
30, at 871 (Jan. 3, 1990).
212. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,996 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 4, 1985). The court concluded that it need not decide whether the secured creditor's
successful bid for the property in foreclosure vested it with "ownership" under CERCLA.
The rationale articulated by the Mirabile court demonstrates a significantly different under-
standing of the secured creditor exemption:
Regardless of the nature of title received by [the bank], its actions with respect to the
foreclosure were plainly undertaken in an effort to protect its security interest in the
property. [The bank] made no effort to continue [its debtor's] operations on the
property, and indeed foreclosed some eight months after all operations ceased ...
... The actions undertaken by [the bank] with respect to the site simply cannot be
deemed to constitute participation in the management of the site.
Id.
213. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986).
The court reasoned that the bank "purchased the property at the foreclosure sale not to pro-
tect its security interest, but to protect its investment. Only during the life of the mortgage did
[the bank] hold indicia of ownership primarily to protect its interest in the land." Id.
214. The Eleventh Circuit did not address the implications of its decision on the holding in
Maryland Bank & Trust.
215. CERCLA's definition of "owner or operator" provides:
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persons who hold "indicia of ownership" are not encompassed within the
term "owner or operator. '2 16 Instead, Congress chose to expressly limit the
class of persons exempted from liability. This narrow class contains only
those persons who hold indicia of ownership primarily to protect a security
interest who have not participated in the management of the facility.2"7
Thus, the plain words of the statute dictated the result arrived at by the
Eleventh Circuit.2 18
"owner or operator" means ...in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore
facility, any person owning or operating such facility, and ...in the case of any
[abandoned] facility .... any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled
activities at such facility immediately [prior to such abandonment]. Such term does
not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a ... facility,
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the.., facility.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
216. CERCLA is notorious for having been a hastily drafted amalgam of several bills that
had been in the works for over three years. See generally Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act
of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982); Burkhart, supra note 2, at 333 n.54. The final bill
was passed in the last few days of a lame duck session of Congress. See, e.g., Smith Land &
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988) (terming CERCLA a
"hastily conceived and briefly debated piece of legislation"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989);
Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (stating
that "CERCLA's legislative history is riddled with uncertainty because lawmakers hastily
drafted the bill, and because last minute compromises forced changes that went largely
unexplained").
217. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823,
848 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (noting, with some embellishment, that CERCLA "literally reads that a
person who owns an interest in a facility and is actively participating in its management can be
held liable" (emphasis added)), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
218. The Eleventh Circuit also relied on dicta in United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp. for the
proposition that holding indicia of ownership was sufficient to trigger ownership-based liability
under CERCLA. See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 20-21 (D.R.I.
1988), aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 957 (1991). Kayser-Roth
involved an action for cleanup costs brought against the parent corporation of a defunct textile
manufacturer that improperly disposed of hazardous substances in connection with its manu-
facturing operations. Id. at 17. The court held that a parent corporation's stock ownership
and participation in the management of a wholly-owned subsidiary is sufficient to establish
liability as an "operator" under CERCLA. Id. at 20-21. The district court observed that a
parent corporation's ownership of stock issued by a subsidiary constitutes "indicia of owner-
ship." Id. at 20. This ownership interest is sufficient to trigger the parent corporation's liabil-
ity as an "owner or operator" if the stockholders participate in the management of the facility.
Id. at 20-21 (citing New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985);
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 848 (W.D. Mo.
1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987)). This is not a universally accepted basis for establishing parent company liability. See
Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 224-25 (W.D. La. 1988) (holding that
parent corporation cannot be held liable under CERCLA unless corporate veil is pierced),
aff'd, 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991). Kayser-Roth is factu-
ally distinguishable, however, from Fleet Factors because the Kayser-Roth court's analysis of
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In sum, to properly apply Fleet Factors, a court must engage in the follow-
ing analysis to determine whether the secured creditor exemption is applica-
ble to a creditor claiming its protection. First, a court must determine
whether the defendant is an "owner." This inquiry requires a determination
of whether the defendant holds either title to, or indicia of ownership in, the
contaminated property. Actual title clearly suffices because the statute holds
the current owner strictly liable for cleanup costs.219 Indicia of ownership
should suffice as well. The definition of "owner" encompasses persons who
hold indicia of ownership because it only exempts a limited subgroup of per-
sons holding indicia of ownership from liability (i.e., those who hold indicia
of ownership primarily to protect a security interest and who have not par-
ticipated in the management of the facility). Second, if the court determines
that the defendant is an "owner," it then must decide whether the secured
creditor exemption applies. In this regard, the basis of ownership, whether
the scope of the meaning of "owner or operator" occurred within the context of the circum-
stances in which stock ownership, as opposed to a security interest, triggers ownership-based
liability for improper disposal of hazardous substances by the issuing corporation. See Kayser-
Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 20-21. The two cases cited for this proposition involved liability of an
individual stockholder for CERCLA response costs. See also United States v. Nicolet, Inc.,
712 F. Supp. 1193, 1202 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (liability of parent corporation); Vermont v. Staco,
Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 831 (D. Vt. 1988) (liability of sister corporation); Idaho v. Bunker Hill
Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 671-72 (D. Idaho 1986) (liability of parent corporation). See generally
Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 986 (1986). The district court in Mirabile expressly denied the direct applicability of
case law involving stock ownership-based liability as an "owner" under CERCLA. See United
States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,995 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
Moreover, the portion of the Kayser-Roth decision relied on by the Eleventh Circuit was only a
recitation of alternate theories of stockholder liability under CERCLA and, therefore, was not
particularly firm ground upon which to base this critical component of the court's holding.
Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 20-21. Firmer ground is provided in the legislative history to one
of the bills ultimately incorporated into CERCLA. The House report on H.R. 85, the Com-
prehensive Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act, defines the term "owner" as
including:
[A]ny person holding title to, or in the absence of title, any other indicia of ownership
of, a vessel or facility, but does not include a person who, without participating in the
management or operation of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily
to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6212, 6213
(emphasis added). This language supports the conclusion that Congress viewed title and indi-
cia of ownership as identical for the purpose of the secured creditor exemption. There is some
guidance in the legislative history directly addressing the implications of the secured creditor
exemption on financial institutions. The committee report on H.R. 85 fails to attach signifi-
cance to the distinction between indicia of ownership and title when it describes the secured
creditor exemption as providing that "a financial institution which held title primarily to se-
cure a loan ... would not be an 'owner' as long as it did not participate in the management or
operation of the vessel or facility." Id.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1).
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by title or indicia of ownership, is critical. If the basis of ownership is actual
title, then the defendant is liable as the current owner of the property. The
exemption is not available. If the basis of ownership is indicia of ownership,
then the statute exempts the defendant from liability if the defendant holds
indicia of ownership "primarily to protect its security interest" and has not
"participat[ed] in the management of the facility."
B. Assessing the Level of Participation in the Management of the Facility
Allowed: Fleet Factors' Delicate Balance
The Eleventh Circuit's construction of the phrase "participat[e] in the
management of the facility" recognizes that some level of participation must
be tolerated to enable secured creditors "to insure that their interests are
being adequately protected."22 The court noted that the exemption pro-
tects participatory conduct in "the normal course of [a secured creditor's]
business."22 Agreeing with the Maryland Bank court, however, the Elev-
enth Circuit refused to construe the secured creditor exemption so broadly
as to "absolve [secured creditors] of their responsibility for their mistakes of
judgment."2 22
220. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, III S. Ct. 752 (1991). The court rejected adoption of a standard that would impose
liability on secured creditors "that participate[ ] in any manner in the management of a facil-
ity." Id. No court has discussed, much less adopted, such a stringent standard. The govern-
ment's argument does evidence, however, the hard line that it is prepared to take in seeking out
responsible parties. EPA Administrator William Reilly sent the financial community mixed
signals regarding the government's stance on this issue in remarks he made shortly after the
Fleet Factors decision was announced. He said that it was not the government's intention to
hold secured creditors liable for cleanup costs "even if they own property contaminated with
hazardous waste. However, [he] did not say that the government would change its policy of
doing so." Justice Department Reviewing Liability Issues; Lender Liability Cases Not 'In-
tended,'Reilly Says, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 358 (June 22, 1990); see also Tom, supra
note 57, at 927-28; Burcat, supra note 57, at 526-31.
221. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1556.
222. Id. at 1557. The court rejected the approach of permitting unrestricted participation
in the financial management of the facility, but shunning participation in "the day-to-day or
operational management of a facility," because it would render the secured creditor exemption
meaningless. Id. at 1556. This construction was adopted by the Mirabile court. See Mirabile,
15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996. The lower court in Fleet Factors followed this
lead by construing the secured creditor exemption to permit "financial assistance and general,
and even isolated instances of specific, management advice." Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. at
960. This interpretation erroneously ignores the canon of statutory construction applicable to
remedial statutes, like CERCLA, that "ambiguous statutory terms should be construed to
favor liability." Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557. Moreover, this construction would render the
secured creditor exemption meaningless because a
broad interpretation of the exemption would essentially require a secured creditor to
be involved in the operations of a facility in order to incur liability .... Individuals
and entities involved in the operations of a facility are already liable as operators
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The court's interpretation of the secured creditor exemption makes sense.
The phrase "participating in the management," although part of the defini-
tion of "owner or operator," only identifies the circumstances under which a
person who holds indicia of ownership may be liable under CERCLA as an
"owner." The phrase logically modifies only that portion of the definition of
"owner or operator" that pertains to ownership-related liability.223 Signifi-
cantly, there is no evidence that Congress intended the types of conduct con-
stituting "participat[ion] in the management" and "operat[ion]" to be the
same.2 24  The court properly drew on the available legislative history in
concluding that "a more peripheral degree of involvement with the affairs of
a facility than that necessary to be held liable as an operator" is sufficient to
establish liability for participation in management.22 5
under the express language of section 9607(a)(2). Had Congress intended to absolve
secured creditors from ownership liability, it would have done so. Instead, the statu-
tory language chosen by Congress explicitly holds secured creditors liable if they
participate in the management of a facility.
Id. (emphasis added).
223. It would indeed be difficult to conceive of circumstances under which an operator
does not, at a minimum, participate in the management of the facility. This is the bread and
butter of CERCLA's enforcement structure. Imposition of liability for no less than participa-
tion in the debtor's day-to-day business would destroy any incentive for a creditor to monitor
its debtor for compliance with applicable environmental laws. But see Tom, supra note 57, at
935-36. The author argues that
the security interest exemption only makes sense if management participation encom-
passes at a minimum activities that would lead to operator liability under the general
liability scheme. To interpret the term as something less than those actions that
would lead to liability as an operator would be illogical, since banks would be more
susceptible to liability under the carved-out exemption than under the general liabil-
ity scheme.
Id.
224. CERCLA's legislative history provides minimal guidance by employing circular ter-
minology in its explanation of the term "operator." "[A]n 'operator' is defined to be a person
who is carrying out the operationalfunctions for the owner of the facility pursuant to an appro-
priate agreement." H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 36-37 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6160, 6182 (emphasis added). The regulations implementing CER-
CLA's sister-statute, RCRA, define "operator" as "the person responsible for the overall oper-
ation of a facility." See 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1991). There is only limited guidance elsewhere
in CERCLA's legislative history concerning the meaning of the term "operator."
Operators of vessels do not include those individuals who are not totally responsible
for the operation of a vessel. To fall within the definition, the individual must have
assumed the full range of operational responsibility. For example, a pilot might be in
charge of navigation of a vessel for a short duration, yet he does not meet the defini-
tion of "operator," since he neither mans nor supplies the vessel. In the case of a
facility, an "operator" is defined to be a person who is carrying out operational func-
tions for the owner of the facility pursuant to an appropriate agreement.
H.R. REP. No. 172, at 36, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160, 6181-82.
225. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558 n.l 1. The court's reading is plausible, but not wholly
persuasive, unless read in the context of the entire legislative scheme. The court's reading of
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The Eleventh Circuit, in broadly construing the phrase "participat[e] in
the management," concluded that future courts could distinguish permissi-
ble from impermissible secured creditor conduct by determining whether the
creditor's involvement in the management of the facility is "sufficiently
broad to support the inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal
decisions if it so chose." '226 The court explained that a court can infer a
secured creditor's "capacity to influence" a debtor's hazardous waste dispo-
sal decisions "from the extent of [the creditor's] involvement in the facility's
financial management." '22 7 Thus, the court's construction of the phrase
"participat[e] in the management" does require some actual involvement in
the debtor's affairs at the facility.22 Liability cannot be premised solely
upon an unrealized "capacity to influence" a debtor's hazardous waste dis-
posal decisions. If a creditor does not participate in the "financial manage-
ment" of the facility, there is no basis for an "inference" that the creditor has
the "capacity to influence" the debtor's hazardous waste disposal activi-
ties.229 Thus, the court's construction of the phrase "participat[e] in the
the legislative history also may be inaccurate. The Congressman's remarks seem to reflect
concern that owners or operators will attempt to avoid liability through use of corporate sub-
sidiaries and, therefore, his remarks are not necessarily addressing the issue the court in Fleet
Factors cites them for. Earlier remarks of Congressman Harsha, however, do support the
court's conclusion. In 1980, speaking on the same issue, he said: "My amendment also re-
quires that those that hold title cannot be affilated [sic] in any way with those who [operate]
the facility. This was done to prevent the establishment of 'dummy' corporations, with few
assets, which would be the responsible party for the purpose of the act." 126 CONG. REC.
26,210-12 (1980), quoted in Burkhart, supra note 2, at 333 n.54.
226. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557-58. Fleet, in its petition for certiorari, complained that
this construction triggers liability based on the thin reed of "purely hypothetical facts and
inferences.... [and thus] virtually [encompasses] all instances [where a secured creditor has
become involved in its debtor's affairs]." Petition for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 9. Nonethe-
less, even critics of a narrow construction of the secured creditor exemption acknowledge that
such a construction is "consistent with the expansive interpretations generally given to
CERLCA's liability provisions." Tom, supra note 57, at 928.
227. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1559 n.13 (emphasis added). It is interesting that, in the
court's words, most likely crafted to track the statute's language, the basis for this inference is
the creditor's "involvement in the facility's financial management." Id. (emphasis added). The
court appears to leave room for a defense that participation involving the debtor's financial
management does not necessarily support a corresponding inference of involvement at the
facility. Id. The court noted that facts creating such an "inference" need not be considered in
the case at bar.
228. Id. at 1559 n.13; see also infra note 232 (discussing the recent Ninth Circuit decision
construing the holding in Fleet Factors as requiring some level of actual involvement in the
management of a facility to incur ownership-based liability under CERCLA).
229. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1559 n. 13. The court held that there was no need to draw
such an "inference" in this case because there was direct evidence that "Fleet actively asserted
its control over the disposal of hazardous wastes at the site by prohibiting SPW from selling
several barrels of chemicals to potential buyers. As a result, the barrels remained at the facility
unattended until the EPA acted to remove [them]." Id.; see also infra text at note 233 (defin-
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management of the facility" permits limited types of participatory conduct
that will facilitate the critical economic incentives for both creditors ,and
debtors to comply with applicable environmental laws but will not result in
liability.
Critics have complained that the broad construction of "participat[e] in
the management" adopted in Fleet Factors "discourage[s] secured creditors
from taking an active role in helping to resolve problems that may arise after
the loan is made."23 The court anticipated and properly dismissed this crit-
icism as unfounded. 3 Secured creditors are concerned that, by insisting
that their debtors comply with environmental laws, they will expose them-
selves to liability because this conduct would indicate a "capacity to influ-
ence" a debtor's hazardous waste activities.232 However, interpreting Fleet
Factors as imposing liability under such circumstances is inappropriate. As
ing scope of permissible "financial management"). But see Petition for Certiorari, supra note
20, at 9-10 (arguing that standard loan agreement covenants obligating a borrower to comply
with existing laws, without more, could trigger liability under the Eleventh Circuit's construc-
tion of the secured creditor exemption).
230. Parenteau & Johnson, supra note 38, at 381; see also Note, Cleaning Up the Debris
After Fleet Factors: Lender Liability and CERCLA's Security Interest Exemption, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 1249, 1257 (1991). This argument proves too much. It is not axiomatic that discour-
aging lenders from helping borrowers resolve environmental problems that may arise after the
loan is made is undesirable. Banks are hardly equipped to make cleanup decisions. Banks lack
sufficient technical expertise and the requisite disinterestedness in the costs reasonably required
to do the job properly.
231. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558; see also supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
232. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 8. Secured creditors are not wholly un-
justified in voicing this concern. The Eleventh Circuit opinion employs language that, at least
when read alone, is both ambiguous and expansive. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557-58 (using
phrases such as "indicating a capacity to influence" and "support the inference that [the credi-
tor] could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose" to describe the threshold of
conduct giving rise to liability). This language must, however, be read in conjunction with the
limiting phrases employed in the opinion. See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
This is precisely how this language was interpreted by the Ninth Circuit when it concluded
that the Fleet Factors decision held that a secured creditor must participate in some fashion in
the management of the facility before it can be removed from the protection of the secured
creditor exemption. See In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990). Moreover,
the language employed by the Eleventh Circuit in Fleet Factors was not inconsistent with other
court decisions construing, for example, the scope of "operator" liability under CERCLA. See
United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 864 (D. Del. 1989). The court in New
Castle County noted that liability has been imposed where "'an individual has control or au-
thority over the activities of a facility from which hazardous substances are released or partici-
pates in the management of such a facility.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Carolawn Co., 21
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124, 2131 (D.S.C. 1984) (emphasis removed)); see also United States
v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1204 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (stating that parent corporation's
"capacity to control [hazardous substance] disposal and resultant release" supports finding of
liability); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986) (finding that "ca-
pacity to control [hazardous substance] disposal and resultant release" supports finding of
liability). But see Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (N.D. Ill.
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the court explained, "Nothing in our discussion should preclude a secured
creditor from monitoring any aspect of a debtor's business. Likewise, a se-
cured creditor can become involved in "occasional and discrete financial de-
cisions relating to the protection of its security interest without incurring
liability."233 Fleet's conduct with respect to SPW clearly fell outside the
permitted range of permissible participation. For example, Fleet refused to
allow SPW to spend funds to remove drums of hazardous chemicals from
the property.234 Fleet's conduct at the facility most likely prompted the
court to conclude that secured creditors can and will assert significant influ-
ence over what happens to hazardous substances. In this regard, the deci-
sion is both pragmatic and fair.
Courts and legislators examining Fleet Factors will measure the Eleventh
Circuit's construction of the phrase "participat[e] in the management" by
the yardstick of its impact on the effectuation of CERCLA's "broad reme-
dial goals." Critics have charged, for example, that the decision will drasti-
cally limit the ability of companies to borrow funds when they have
environmental problems. 235 Assuming for the sake of argument that this is
true, it is not at all clear that such a result is undesirable. CERCLA, after
all, was designed in large part to force companies that profit in some way
from their use or creation of hazardous substances to internalize the costs of
the hazardous waste's disposal.2 36 Companies unable to obtain financing
1988) (holding that "[m]ere ability to exercise control as the result of a financial relationship of
the parties is insufficient for liability to attach").
233. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (1lth Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, Ill S. Ct. 752 (1991).
234. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955, 961 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 901 F.2d 1550 (1lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991). In
addition, Fleet's agents handling the sale and removal of equipment located at the SPW facility
left it in a condition that "constituted an immediate risk to public health and the environ-
ment." Id. Drums of hazardous waste were moved to facilitate the equipment sale and friable
asbestos was released when the equipment that was sold was disconnected. Id. at 960-61.
235. Parenteau & Johnson, supra note 38, at 381.
236. The legislative history of CERCLA is replete with admonitions from members of
Congress that the legislation stands for the principle that the polluter must pay. See Burkhart,
supra note 2, at 326 n.20. The phrase "the polluter must pay" was not meant, however, to
imply a limited number of persons who would be liable for cleanup costs. Senator Lautenberg,
speaking in connection with consideration of SARA, remarked that the enormous expense of
cleaning up hazardous waste sites "will require a financial contribution from a range of parties,
some of whom may not have contributed directly [but] have benefited from the products pro-
duced by the [polluting] industries." Id. at 325 n. 19. Congress's imposition of strict liability is
additional support for the conclusion that Congress wanted polluters to internalize the various
costs associated with resulting from activities that create hazardous substances: "strict liability
... assures that those who benefit financially from a commercial activity internalize the health
and environmental costs of that activity into the cost of doing business." New Castle County,
727 F. Supp. at 858 (quoting S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess, at 13 (1980)).
1991]
Catholic University Law Review
will suffer this plight because either they, or their market, could not with-
stand to internalize the costs associated with the creation or use of hazard-
ous substances.
C. Secured Creditor Liability' CERCLA's Private Enforcement
Mechanism Lurking in the Shadows of Fleet Factors
The Fleet Factors decision has been roundly criticized. 237 The criticisms
primarily focus on the perceived far-reaching implications this decision will
have on commercial lending practices and, ultimately, on the financial health
of this nation's businesses.238 Critics assert that, at a minimum, imposing
liability on secured creditors for low-level participatory conduct will reduce
lending to businesses, prevent secured creditors from conducting effective
loan workout activities, and destroy any incentive for secured creditors to
assist in resolving a debtor's environmental problems. 239 Critics of Fleet Fac-
tors, however, acknowledge the effectiveness of CERCLA's liability scheme,
a scheme which "has created a very effective 'private enforcement' mecha-
nism in which lenders play a commanding and . ..constructive role.
' 2
1
237. See, e.g., Parenteau & Johnson, supra note 38, at 381 (acknowledging that the decision
may cause lenders to be "even more cognizant of environmental concerns," but concluding
that any tangible benefits will be marginal and are more than offset by the negative implica-
tions of the opinion).
238. See, e.g., Bradley S. Tupi & William R. Nicholson, Legislation to Restore CERCLA's
Security Interest Exemption, Which Bill Should Lenders Support?, 6 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No.
5, at 161 (July 3, 1991) [hereinafter Legislation to Restore CERCLA's Security Interest]; see also
Petition for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 5-7. The lead argument in Fleet's petition for certio-
rari is that the Eleventh Circuit's construction of the secured creditor exemption disrupts
"normal and prudent" commercial practices. Id. at 5.
239. See supra note 238.
240. Parenteau & Johnson, supra note 38, at 381; see also Sherman Braff, The Lender as
Environmental Policeman: Comment on EPA's Draft Lender Liability Rules, 5 Toxics L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 44, at 1428 (Apr. 10, 1991) (noting that secured creditors are "uniquely positioned
to serve an 'environmentally beneficial' function by virtue of their influence over their
customers and their natural incentive to monitor their collateral," but arguing that the threat
of liability is not the most efficient manner in which to capitalize on these incentives). See
generally United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,996 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 4, 1985) (acknowledging the argument that imposing "liability [on secured creditors]
would help to ensure more responsible management of [hazardous waste] sites"); Glenn
Unterberger, Lender Liability Under Superfund: What the Congress Meant to Say Was.... 5
Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 571 (Sept. 26, 1990). Mr. Unterberger writes that the real
benefit underlying this private enforcement mechanism is that it will alter conduct that leads to
the problems CERCLA was intended to remediate: the illegal disposal of hazardous
substances.
[T]o the extent businesses that depend on credit understand, for example, that lend-
ers will not extend credit until they have conducted appropriate inquiry into and/or
obtained indemnification for any contamination on property serving as security, busi-
nesses presumably will place much greater priority on avoiding or remediating any
such contamination. Similar incentives will result from loan agreements establishing
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The effectiveness of the private enforcement mechanism is a direct result of
the threat of liability on secured creditors.2 4 '
The question implicitly confronting the Eleventh Circuit was simple: Ab-
sent the threat of liability, will the diligence of secured creditors in investi-
gating, and thereby identifying, environmental contamination, among other
things, persist? The court concluded that it would not.2 4 2 A bank that de-
mands a costly environmental audit is clearly at a competitive disadvantage
as compared to a bank offering financing without similar preconditions. Re-
moving the threat of liability eliminates the key incentive for secured credi-
tors to thoroughly investigate property offered as collateral and the
corresponding incentive for borrowers to clean up contaminated property.
Thus, removing secured creditor liability would vitiate an effective private
enforcement mechanism that plays a "commanding" role in CERCLA.24 3
The debate over the propriety of the interpretation of the secured creditor
exemption in Fleet Factors is in reality little more than a disagreement as to
the chosen threshold of participatory conduct triggering liability. The Elev-
enth Circuit's decision reflects the social policy underpinnings of CERCLA.
The decision is consistent with the policy choices made by Congress when it
enacted, and later reauthorized, CERCLA. For example, Congress explic-
itly weighed the costs and benefits of imposing liability on secured creditors
in 1986 when it reauthorized CERCLA. 2" Five years of experience taught
Congress that the problems posed by the improper disposal of hazardous
inadequate ongoing hazardous substance management practices during the extension
of credit as an indication of default.
Id.
241. For example, one critic of Fleet Factors decision observed that the imposition of liabil-
ity on secured creditors makes sense from an enforcement standpoint.
Lenders have both the incentive and the leverage to insist that hazardous waste
problems be identified and resolved as a condition of financing transactions; and, that
borrowers covenant to continuous monitoring and strict compliance throughout the
loan period. Lenders routinely insist on rigorous site investigations, compliance au-
dits and remedial actions as a part of business transactions involving real property.
Parenteau & Johnson, supra note 38, at 381. The EPA has implicitly acknowledged that it
lacks sufficient resources, for example, to locate persons potentially liable for response costs.
See Advertising for PRPs-EPA Plans National Hotline for PRP Informers, 4 Inside EPA's
Superfund Rep. No. 19, at 8-9 (Sept. 12, 1990). For example, the agency has resorted to
solicitation of information regarding the identity of potentially responsible parties through ad-
vertisements in local newspapers in the vicinity of superfund sites. Id.
242. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990) ("credi-
tors' awareness that they are potentially liable under CERCLA will encourage them to moni-
tor the hazardous waste treatment systems and policies of their debtors and insist upon
compliance with acceptable treatment standards as a prerequisite to continued and future fi-
nancial support"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
243. Parenteau & Johnson, supra note 38, at 381.
244. See supra note 1.
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substances were far greater than originally envisioned.24 The legislative his-
tory of SARA clearly demonstrates Congress's intent to create enforcement
mechanisms designed to aid the EPA in carrying out CERCLA's seemingly
overwhelming statutory mission.2 4 6 The Fleet Factors-court was doing its
job by giving effect to Congress's intent to impose "tough legal enforcement
standards" in the uphill battle to remedy a serious national environmental
crisis.2 47 The Eleventh Circuit's decision, having expressly recognized the
impact of imposing liability on secured creditors,248 properly refused to gut
this enforcement mechanism. Future courts may judge Fleet Factors as hav-
ing gone too far, but this seems unlikely. The Eleventh Circuit properly
recognized that the threat of liability alters conduct and that in 1980 Con-
gress wanted to do precisely that when it enacted CERCLA. The court
rebuffed Fleet's demand for special treatment under CERCLA by establish-
ing "safe harbors" for unlimited activities in the name of "protecting a se-
curity interest." In fact, Fleet's own irresponsible conduct mandated this
result.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES ENTER THE HUNT
FOR THE ELUSIVE THRESHOLD TO SECURED CREDITOR LIABILITY
A. The EPA's Solution-Establish a Rule that Interprets "Participate in
Management" to Permit Reasonable Loan Workouts and Foreclosure
The EPA is promulgating a rule to clarify the circumstances under
which a secured creditor will be liable under CERCLA. 249 The goal of this
245. Id.
246. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9617 (1988)).
247. See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2837. The House report noted that
The current reauthorization, coming when it does, forces Congress to face a very
fundamental policy question: how to ensure in the future that there are adequate
resources [to clean up hazardous waste sites] ....
... It is clear from accumulating data on waste sites that [the] EPA will never
have adequate monies or manpower to address the problem itself. As a result, an
underlying principle of [SARA] is that Congress must facilitate cleanups of hazard-
ous substances by the responsible parties while assuring a strong EPA oversight role
with a set of tough legal enforcement standards.
248. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
249. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300) (proposed June 24,
1991); see also Braff, supra note 240, at 1424, EPA Draft Proposal Defining Lender Liability
Issues Under the Secured Creditor Exemption of CERCLA, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at
1162-67 (Oct. 12, 1990) [hereinafter EPA Draft Proposal] (reprinting text of earlier draft of the
rule). This rule was delayed for several months while pending review at the White House
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rule2"' is to clarify the scope of the secured creditor exemption in a
manner that
reconcile[s] a security holder's need to manage, oversee, or to
otherwise protect a security interest, with EPA's duty to clean up
waste sites and recover public funds spent in remediating these
Office of Management and Budget. See, e.g., OMB Staff Argue EPA Superfund Rule Fails to
Protect Banks From Unfair Costs, 12 Inside EPA Weekly Rep. No. 12, at 1 (Mar. 22, 1991). It
has been suggested that the delay is attributable to the executive branch's hope that this would
prompt congressional action, an alternative preferred by members of the banking industry.
See, e.g., Defining Superfund Liability Limits, 11 Inside EPA Weekly Rep. No. 4, at 1, 6-7
(Oct. 12, 1990).
250. The authority for and circumstances under which an agency may issue interpretative
rules is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (d) (1988). Inter-
pretative rules may be issued by an agency without public comment. Id. § 553(b). The EPA
provided a 30-day comment period for this proposed interpretative rule, however, due to "the
important issues" raised. See EPA Draft Proposal, supra note 249, at 1162. The EPA has
taken the position that this rulemaking is subject only to review by the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals in accordance with CERCLA's provisions regarding regulations
promulgated under the statute. Id. at 1163 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 553(b)). Discussion of the
legal effect of "interpretative" rules is beyond the scope of this Note. Generally, an "interpre-
tative" rule is a "statemento made by an agency to give guidance to its staff and affected
parties as to how the agency intends to administer a statute or regulation." New Jersey v.
Department of Health & Human Servs., 670 F.2d 1262, 1281-82 (3d Cir. 1981) (alteration in
original) (quoting Daughters of Miriam Ctr. For the Aged v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 1250, 1258
(3d Cir. 1978)); see also Jerri's Ceramic Arts, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 874
F.2d 205, 207-08 (4th Cir. 1989); Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1984). Interpreta-
tive rules are commonly distinguished by the courts from "legislative" rules. "A legislative
rule, rather than merely setting forth an agency's own interpretation of the meaning of a stat-
ute it administers, actually implements that statute and, in doing so, 'creates' new law 'affect-
ing individual rights and obligations.'" New Jersey, 670 F.2d at 1282 (quoting Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974)); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Bat-
terton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-26 (1977); National Latino Media Coalition v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 816 F.2d 785, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1987); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Reagan, 685 F. Supp. 1346, 1356 (E.D. La. 1988), aff'd, 891 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1989).
The legal effect of "interpretative" rules varies from that of "legislative" rules. "Interpretative
rules are 'not controlling upon the courts.., inasmuch as they are not promulgated pursuant
to a delegation by Congress of authority to legislate.'" New Jersey, 670 F.2d at 1282 (quoting
United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 674 (1973)); see also Skid-
more v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 164 (1944) (stating that the deference due interpretative
rulings "will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronoucements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control"). The Supreme Court, however, has
held that courts must accord "great deference" to agency rules because they represent an
"interpretation given [a] statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration."
New Jersey, 670 F.2d at 1282 (alteration in original) (quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16
(1965)). The standard of reasonableness limits this deference to an agency's interpretation.
Thus, courts evaluating the EPA interpretative rule
need not find that [the agency's] construction is the only reasonable one, or even that
it is the result [the court] would have reached had the question arisen in the first
instance in judicial proceedings .... All that is needed to support the [agency's]
interpretation is that it has "warrant in the record" and a "reasonable basis in law."
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sites from those responsible or otherwise involved in the facility's
operations, either through their participation in management...
or through their own activities at the facility.
2 51
The rule interprets the secured creditor exemption as permitting a broad
range of lender activity as long as the creditor intends the activity to "pri-
marily protect a security interest.
212
The EPA rule accomplishes this task by defining three key phrases in the
secured creditor exemption: "indicia of ownership," "primarily to protect
the security interest," and "participat[e] in ... management., 2 3 The rule
defines "indicia of ownership" as encompassing "interests in real or personal
property held as security or collateral for a loan or other obigation, includ-
ing full title to real or personal property acquired incident to foreclosure and
Id. at 1283 (alterations in original) (quoting Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Ara-
gon, 329 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1946)); see also Joseph v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554
F.2d 1140, 1153 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
251. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,800 (1991). The EPA clearly sees an important commercial mandate
for this rule. "CERCLA liability needs to be as certain and predictable as possible, and should
not inhibit financial transactions unnecessarily." EPA Promises Clarifying Rule to Protect
Lenders, Won't Oppose Legislation, 4 Inside EPA's Superfund Rep., No. 17, at 6 (Aug. 15,
1990) (quoting prepared testimony of James Strock, Asst. Administrator for Enforcement,
EPA, before the Transportation and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee, Energy and Com-
merce Committee, House of Representatives). There are certainly other significant motives for
this rule. The EPA previously expressed its belief that such a rule would be beneficial to
government lenders, guarantors, and receivers because it limits their exposure to CERCLA
liability. See, e.g., Federal Lenders Line Up for Protection From Superfund Liability, 5 Inside
EPA's Superfund Rep. No. 1, at 1 (Jan. 2, 1991); EPA Says New Lender Rule Will Be Written
to Clarify Activity Triggering Superfund Law, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 353 (Aug. 8,
1990). The EPA is particularly concerned that foreclosures occurring in the wake of the sav-
ings and loan crisis will contribute significantly to the cost of the S&L bailout. EPA Promises
to Exempt Banks From Superfund Costs on Foreclosed Land, 11 Inside EPA Weekly Rep. No.
32, at 12 (Aug. 10, 1990). Specifically, the agency has publicly expressed concern that money
allocated to the bailout will unnecessarily be diverted to the payment of cleanup and litigation
costs. Id. at 12.
252. See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg. at 28,808-09; see also Bankers Hail New EPA Lender Liability
Rule, Environmentalists Decry Loophole, Inside EPA Weekly Rep., No. 5, at 17 (Feb. 15, 1991)
(describing changes to EPA rule members of banking and environmental lobbies favor). The
development of this new rule was the product of a difficult political process. See, e.g., OMB
Staff Argue EPA Lender Liability Rule Fails to Protect Banks, 5 Inside EPA's Superfund Rep.
No. 7, at 3 (Mar. 27, 1991); EPA and Congressional Staff Say OMB is Blocking Lender Liabil-
ity Rule, Inside EPA Weekly Rep., No. 6, at 3 (Mar. 8, 1991) (stating that some OMB staff
members reportedly believed that delay might prompt congressional action). Even the states
are beginning to take a stand. See, e.g., FDIC, RTC Claim Federal Liability Law Hamper
Selling Insolvent Institutions, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 687 (Apr. 15, 1991).
253. 56 Fed. Reg. at 28,802-03.
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its equivalents." '254 This definition is consistent with the limited attention it
has received by the courts.
255
The EPA rule broadly interprets the phrase "primarily to protect the se-
curity interest" and allows creditors to protect their interest by policing the
loan, by undertaking a financial workout with a borrower where the security
interest is threatened, and by foreclosing and expeditiously liquidating the
assets securing the loan.2" 6 This portion of the rule conflicts with Maryland
Bank, which held that foreclosure terminates the protection of the secured
creditor exemption. Under the EPA rule, foreclosure will not trigger liabil-
ity unless the secured creditor causes or contributes to the environmental
contamination.257 Moreover, the rule specifically permits secured creditors
to engage in mitigative or preventive measures without incurring liability.
25 8
Finally, the EPA rule defines "participat[ion] in the management." The
rule acknowledges that the question of whether a secured creditor has in fact
participated in the management of the facility, thereby removing it from the
protection of the secured creditor exemption, requires the court to conduct a
fact-sensitive inquiry.259 The EPA rule, deliberately contradicting the lan-
guage employed by the Eleventh Circuit to determine whether a secured
creditor has impermissibly participated in management of a facility, provides
that "participation in the management" does not include the mere capacity
or ability to influence facility operations. 2 °
254. Id. at 28,809. Some examples given are "a mortgage, deeds of trust, or legal title
obtained pursuant to foreclosure, or an assignment, lien, pledge, or other right to or other form
of encumbrance against the property." Id. The rule interprets the exemption to only reach
those encumbrances granted for the purpose of security for a loan. Id. The rule explicitly
provides that the term does not encompass "an interest in the nature of an investment" in
contaminated property. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 28,808-09. The rule further reaffirms the position taken by the Eleventh Circuit
that the secured creditor exemption also allows a secured creditor to monitor the debtor's
business, conduct site inspections, and require certification of compliance with applicable laws
without risking "owner" liability under CERCLA. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 28,809. The rule provides that such activities will not be construed to be "par-
ticipation in the management" of the facility. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. The rule offers the following interpretation of the phrase "participation in the
management:"
A security holder is considered to be participating in management if, while the bor-
rower is still in possession, the security holder is either:
(i) exercising decisionmaking control over the borrower's environmental compli-
ance, such that the security holder has undertaken responsibility for the borrower's
waste disposal or hazardous substance handling practices which results in a release
or a threatened release; or
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B. The Congressional Solution-Amend the Secured Creditor Exemption
in the Name of "Original Intent"
Several bills pending in both the House and Senate are designed to re-
spond to the issue of the liability of secured creditors under CERCLA.2 6
No bills made it out of the 101st Congress despite last minute efforts to agree
upon compromise language.26 2 The two key bills, however, have been rein-
troduced this Congress.2 63 The principal House bill, introduced by Con-
gressman LaFalce, essentially codifies an earlier version of the EPA rule.
264
The Senate's principal bill, introduced by Senator Garn, is less generous to
lenders then that proposed in the House and would not eliminate the possi-
bility of liability, only limit it to "the actual benefit conferred ... by a re-
moval, remedial or other response action., 265 Both bills have received
ringing endorsements from the banking industry, the Federal Deposit Insur-
(ii) exercising control at a management level encompassing the borrower's envi-
ronmental compliance responsibilities, comparable to that of a manager of the bor-
rower's enterprise, such that the security holder has assumed or manifested
responsibility for the management of the enterprise by establishing, implementing, or
maintaining the policies or procedures encompassing the day-to-day environmental
compliance decisionmaking of the enterprise.
Id. The EPA's interpretation of the phrase "participation in the management" should be well-
received by the banking community. Most activities, including those that would have previ-
ously subjected a secured creditor to liability as an operator, will be permitted without fear of
ownership-based CERCLA liability.
261. See, e.g., H.R. 1450, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in Inside EPA's
Superfund Rep., Mar. 27, 1991, at 5; S. 651, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 51
Inside EPA's Superfund Rep. No. 7, at 5 (Mar. 27, 1991). H.R. 1450 was introduced with
over 125 co-sponsors. EPA Staff Cites Loopholes in House, Senate Bills to Exempt Banks From
Superfund, Inside EPA Weekly Rep., Mar. 29, 1991, at 11; see also Tupi & Nicholson, Legisla-
tion to Restore CERCLA's Security Interest, supra note 238, at 161.
262. See Garn, Lautenberg Drafting Compromise Bill to Shield Banks From Superfund, 11
Inside EPA Weekly Rep. No. 41, at 1, 6-7 (Oct. 12, 1990). The bills were: H.R. 4494, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (introduced by Rep. LaFalce) and S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)
(introduced by Sen. Garn). The House bill had more than 270 co-sponsors at the end of the
10 1st session. Supporters and Detractors of Lender Liability Bill State Positions, Pesticide &
Toxic Chem. News, Aug. 8, 1991, at I [hereinafter Supporters and Destractors]. Support, how-
ever, is not necessarily unanimous. See Lenders Charge Lautenberg With Attempt to Block
Superfund Exemption, 12 Inside EPA Weekly Rep. No. 9, at 15 (Mar. 15, 1991); New EPA
Superfund Plan Earns Modest Praise, But Fails to Stop Push for Legislative Action, 12 Toxics L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 59 (June 12, 1991) (noting that legislation that goes beyond the EPA
rule in protecting lenders may face opposition from the Bush administration).
263. See High Court Refuses to Review 'Fleet Factors; Bankers Say They Will Seek Legisla-
tive Relief, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1013 (Jan. 16, 1991).
264. See LaFalce Plans to Adopt EPA Draft Rule in New Lender Liability Bill, 12 Inside
EPA Weekly Rep. No. 9, at 16 (Mar. 1, 1991) (stating that this bill satisfies members of the
banking lobby because it will extend to RCRA and will also protect lenders from third party
suits, unlike the current EPA rule).
265. S. 651 § 36(b). For a critique of Senator Garn's bill, see Legislation to Restore CER-
CLA's Security Interest, supra note 261, at 161-64.
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ance Corporation and the Resolution Trust Corporation, among others.2 66
Environmentalists and members of the chemical industry are less support-
ive. 26' Regardless of the participants' motives for their efforts in this legisla-
tive process, the debate their actions have engendered hopefully will focus on
how a liability statute can and should function. Although CERCLA is a
bitter pill by design, the EPA and congressional response to Fleet Factors
demonstrates a coordinated effort to reassess the impact of using secured
creditors as a private enforcement mechanism in CERCLA.2 6 8
V. CONCLUSION
CERCLA is a cornerstone of Congress's attempt to stem the tide of harm
resulting from decades of care-free hazardous substance pollution. The stat-
ute is designed to alter the way companies incorporate the costs of polluting
into their business transactions. Congress concluded that imposition of lia-
bility for improper disposal of hazardous waste is the most effective tool
available to force parties who contribute to the hazardous waste problem to
internalize the cleanup costs stemming from the use and improper disposal
of such substances and to begin using safer disposal methods. The EPA
alone is not equipped to ensure that this crucial mandate is accomplished.
Congress deliberately created a private enforcement mechanism to aid the
EPA in this massive undertaking. By guaranteeing their cooperation under
threat of liability, CERCLA makes secured creditors a crucial component in
the statute's enforcement mechanism. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Fleet Factors represents no more than an implementation of this scheme. It
stands for the proposition that removing the threat of liability will encourage
266. FDIC, Resolution Trust Corp. Seek Protection in Senate Bill Limiting Exposure Under
CERCLA, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 533-34 (July 27, 1990) [hereinafter FDIC Seeks
Protection]. The agency estimates the cost of cleaning up these properties to be three times
their $365 million book value. Id.; Superfund Lender Liability Explored During Senate Hear-
ings, Pesticide & Toxic Chem. News (FCNI) at 19-20 (July 27, 1990) ("We believe it is ex-
tremely important that we do not divert deposit insurance monies from their primary purpose,
no matter how laudable the other goal." (quoting the tesitmony of S. Seelig, Director, Division
of Liquidation, FDIC)). If the FDIC had its druthers, the Senate bill would be modified to
extend the exemption from liability to persons who purchase contaminated assets from the
FDIC. FDIC Seeks Protection, supra, at 534.
267. The chemical industry has assiled the legislation as discriminatory and unwise. Envi-
ronmental groups assert that the rationale for the amendment, a belief that liability is creating
a credit squeeze on small business, has not been substantiated by the lending community. See
Supporters and Detractors, supra note 263, at 19 (quoting the testimony by the Environmental
Defense Fund as asserting that the Senate bill "encourages lenders to take a see-no-evil, hear-
no-evil approach to environmental risks.... As the current S&L scandal has proved, lenders
need more incentives to carefully review their loans, not less.").
268. Unterberger, supra note 240, at 573.
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conduct inimicable to the success of CERCLA's private enforcement mecha-
nism, and thereby, to the statute itself.
Geoffrey Kres Beach
